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I. Preliminary Materials
A-1. General Introduction
This Article examines the Norwegian law of contract formation
and is modelled on a study conducted under the auspices of the Gen-
eral Principles of Law Project of the Cornell Law School concerning
the law of contract formation as it exists in various nations. The re-
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
suits of the study are contained in a report edited by Rudolf B.
Schlesinger (the Report).' This Article follows the Schlesinger
scheme as closely as possible, and seeks to explore the same areas
and ask the same questions as that scheme, so that a reader might
more easily compare Norwegian law to the legal systems examined in
the Report. The challenge to undertake this task is expressly raised
by the Schlesinger Report itself.
The Report does not purport to cover all systems of contract
law; Schlesinger acknowledges this in his introduction. 2 The Report
questions the significance of its results with regard to legal systems
not covered. The Report contends that almost every legal system in
the world is more or less closely related to one of the systems cov-
ered in the Report, but, Schlesinger emphasizes, this hypothesis
must be tested by "re-check[ing the Report's conclusions] against
the law of a particular country. ' '3 He notes that the Italian, Polish,
and Australian-Canadian-New Zealand "Annotations" contained in
the Report are the product of such re-checking, and sends forth the
challenge that inspired this Article:
Such re-checking should be particularly interesting with respect to
the Scandinavian systems, which present original solutions on some
of the controversial problems in this area (and which, but for budg-
etary limitations, would have been covered in the course of the pres-
ent Study).4
B-1. Introduction to the Norwegian Report
I. Comment on the Norwegian Legal System with Particular Refer-
ence to the Law of Contracts
The basic principle of Norwegian contract law is that citizens can
regulate their own economic affairs through contract. Norwegian
contract law has abandoned all requirements of formality and parties
may today make a contract in any way that they find mutually agreea-
ble. Parties may avail themselves of the Norwegian courts to enforce
I R.B. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF
LEGAL SYSTEMS (1968) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER]. The Schlesinger study has two main
components. The first, the General Report, is actually the raison d'itre of the study. It
summarizes the findings and draws a number of conclusions as to the general areas of
agreement found among the various systems studied. The second portion is composed of
a series of so-called National Reports. Here, major topics of contract formation are dis-
cussed in turn. Each nation or group of nations participating in the study describes in turn
its own law with regard to each topic. The various topics are grouped under one of three
headings: (a) offer, (b) acceptance, and (c) other problems concerning conclusion of
contracts.
2 Id. at 29. The following reports or annotations appear: American Report, Commu-
nist Legal Systems Annotation, English Report, Australian-Canadian-New Zealand Anno-
tation, French Report, German-Swiss Report (with Austrian Annotations), Indian Report,
Italian Report, Polish Annotation, and South African Report.
3 Id. at 30.
4 Id. at 30 n.36.
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the rights and duties arising from a valid contract. The basic princi-
ples of contract law have long been recognized in Norway. A funda-
mental rule has been codified since 1687: "Enhver er pligtigt at
efterkomme hvis hand med Mund, Haand og Segl lovet og indgaaet
haver." (Each [person] is duty-bound to abide by [that] which he by
mouth, hand, and seal has entered into and promised.) 5 The bulk of
Norwegian contract law had its genesis in case law and custom.
Eventually the most important rules were compiled and codified by
the Norwegian Contract Code, Avtaleloven. 6 Although most of its pro-
visions are in conformity with previous case law and custom, some of
its sections represent what were wholly new trends of legal thought
at the time of its adoption in 1918. 7 The Code is not an attempt to
exhaustively regulate the questions that arise regarding treatment of
the areas it covers. In modem Norway many important rules have
developed in case law and legal scholarship that now supplement
the Code. The rules in the Code were originally intended to be part
of the Commercial Code and therefore reflect turn-of-the-century
commercial conditions. Norwegian law recogizes that much has
changed since those days, and numerous statutes now provide
mandatory regulation of certain types of contracts.
Some of the types of contracts for which specific statutes may set
mandatory requirements are: (1) purchase contracts; 8 (2) labor con-
tracts;9 (3) transportation contracts;10 (4) rental agreements; I and
5 The Norwegian's Law of King Christian the Fifth of 15 April 1687, Section 5-1-1.
6 The official title of the Code is Lov om avslutning av avtaler, omfuldmagt og om ugyldige
viljeserklderinger, (Law on Formation of Contracts, on Agency, and on Invalid Declarations
of Will)[hereinafter Avtl.]. The Norwegian Contract Code was formulated in cooperation
with Denmark and Sweden. When Finland and Iceland codified their laws regarding con-
tracts, they conformed their efforts to the Norwegian-Danish-Swedish model. The Nordic
codes are not identical in every detail, but are essentially equivalent. Although modified
by subsequent case law and legal scholarship in each nation, efforts are made to keep the
systems on parallel iracks. For example, Nordiske Dommer, a case reporter series of Scandi-
navian appellate decisions, is extensively relied upon and referred to by judges and practi-
tioners throughout Scandinavia. Thus, though one cannot speak of a pan-Scandinavian
law of contracts, the law of Norway's neighbors is probably equivalent to the rules ex-
plored here. In fact, with regard to modern case law, one system may well be found to rely
directly on the precedent of a neighbor.
The Norwegian Contract Code is dated 31 May 1918 no. 4. The date of a law is an
important research aid. The Norwegian Code is organized by date, not subject matter. A
statute or set of statutes is indexed by the date of its final approval by the Norwegian
parliament, Storting. Subsequent amendments appear on the face of the statute, but its
chronological order does not change. A new official edition of the statutes, Norges Lover
(Norwegian Laws), is issued every two years. The statutes appear in their original order,
as amended, and with extensive reference, by footnote, to related statutes and statutory
language.
7 See, e.g., Avtl., supra note 6, § 33, regarding validity.
8 Lov om kjob av 24 mai 1907 no. 2 (Sales Code), Lov om kj6p pa avbetaling av 21
juli 1916 no. 9 (Credit Sales Code).
9 Lov om arbeidervern av 7 desember 1956 no. 2 (Workers Protection Law), Lov om
offentlige tjenestem~end av 15 februar 1918 no. I (Law of Public Servants), Sj6mann-
sloven av 30 mai 1975 no. 18 (Law of Seamen).
10 Lov om sj6farten av 20 juli 1893 no. 1 (Maritime Code), Lov om luftfart av 16
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(5) insurance contracts.12
Further, the Price, Profit, and Competition Law' 3 has had a dra-
matic impact on consumer contracts. Under section 18 of this stat-
ute, courts have broad discretion to invalidate contracts for
unreasonable prices or conditions. These statutes evidence the ex-
tent of governmental regulation in this area, and suggest that in
many cases the express provisions of the parties, or the declaration
rules, are superseded by mandatory law.
Norway has thus rather freely blended elements of a civil law
system with those of a common law system. Norway had a Contracts
Code as of 1918. As one would expect in a civil law system, the Stor-
ting, Norway's Parliament, has subsequently amended the Code, and
supplemented it with other laws as well. Yet the codification is far
from exhaustive, and Norwegian courts, like their common law coun-
terparts, have contributed much by way of case law to the total pic-
ture. Legal scholarship also appears to have had a marked impact.
This state of affairs should surprise no one. Consider geogra-
phy: Norway sits like a wedge astride the North Sea with the German
civil code to the Southeast, and English common law to the South-
west. Norway's geographical position is reflected in her history. The
nation's 400-year union with Denmark saw a period of extensive
domination of Norwegian commerce and trade by the Hanseatic
League. 14 In more recent times, Norway has leaned more to the
West, and drawn heavily upon the English and American systems.
This influence has been felt even more keenly since World War II.
The Norwegian legal system has always taken many impulses from
France as well.
As the main body of this Article suggests, this diversity of origin
seems to be reflected as well in the substance of the law. Thus,
although Norway holds fast to the promise principle of the Conti-
nent, Norwegian courts cushion some of its impact where it seems
reasonable to do so. The m6lange is not composed only of foreign
elements, however. As the Schlesinger Report suggests, and this Ar-
ticle details, Norwegian law presents a number of original solutions
to certain contractual issues.
desember 1960 no. 1 (Air Transport Code), Lov om befordring av personer og gods pajernbanene av 23 februar 1973 no. 10 (Railroad Code), Lov om vegfraktavtaler av 20
desember 1974 no. 68 (Law of Highway Freight Contracts).
I I Lov om husteie av 16juni 1939 no. 6 (House Rental Code-Extensive regulation).
12 Lov om forsikringsavtaler av 6juni 1930 no. 20 (Insurance Contract Code).
" Lov om kontroll og regUlering av priser, utbytte, og konkurranseforheld av 26juni
1953 no. 4.
1- The German influence seems particularly strong. The German-Swiss Report (Aus-
trian Annotations) appearing in the Schlesinger Report was very helpful in understanding
Norwegian law at several points. hlis reliance is noted where appropriate in the body of
the paper.
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I. The "Promise Principle," 16fte prinsippet in Norwegian Con-
tract Law
Norwegian contract law has as its most basic premise what
Norwegians term lo'fe prinsippet, the "promise principle." 15 Norway
has a long history of applying the promise principle throughout the
body of its law. 16 The earliest codification of 1ofte prinsippet occurred
in 1687.17
The principle is perhaps best understood when viewed against
the contrasting principle that forms the basis of Anglo-American
contract law, as well as the law in many other systems. Norwegians
call this the "contract principle." For convenience, this Article will
use this terminology, though admittedly it is far from satisfactory.
Knoph and Arnholm both cite the Romans as the source of the
"contract principle."1 8 The Romans were of the opinion that no one
could singlehandedly impose an obligation on himself. They viewed
the contract as the thing that created legal rights and duties.19 Many
states endorse this view even today, not least among them states in
the Anglo-American system. Thus, in England and the United States
a promise becomes irrevocable (in Scandinavian terms, "binds the
promisor") only if the promisee has himself promised or given the
promisor consideration.2 0
The promise principle says that no contract is needed. In es-
sence, "a promise is a promise," or perhaps "what you promise, you
deliver." Norwegians and others who apply the principle state sim-
ply, " A promise is 'binding'." Arnholm states the rule as follows:
"Selve l6ftet er nok, s5 sant det bare efter sitt innhold tar sikte p5 5
binde promitenten."' u (The making of the promise is itself sufficient
[to make the promise binding] just so long as its contents contemplate
a binding obligation upon the promisor.) 22 A more to-the-point def-
inition is: "(Man er) normalt bundet av sine ensidige tilsagn." (One
is normally bound by one's unilateral promises.) 23
The above definitions necessitate a comment on the Norwegian
term bindende lofte (binding promise). This is the concept to which
the language emphasized above refers. The Norwegian verb d binde
is a cognate of the English "to bind." Nevertheless, a direct transla-
15 C.J. ARNHOLM, PRIVAT RE-Ir II, AVTALER 50 (1964) [hereinafter ARNHOLM PII].
16 R. KNOPH, OVERSIKT OVER NORGES RETr 347 (9th ed. 1987)[hereinafter KNOPH].
17 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18 See KNOPH, supra note 16, at 327; see also ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 47.
19 KNOPH, supra note 16, at 347.
20 Id.
21 Promilenten is the Norwegian term for promisor; promissaren is the word used to
refer to the promisee. See E. GULBRANSEN,JURIDISK LEKSIKON 166 (4th ed. 1977) [hereinaf-
ter GULBRANSEN].
22 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 47 (emphasis added).
23 KNOPH, supra note 16, at 347 (emphasis added).
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tion into English in the contexts of the above definitions does not
adequately convey the legal sense of the word as used in Norwegian.
In Anglo-American terminology, one speaks of revocable and ir-
revocable offers. One could also, presumably, speak of revocable
and irrevocable acceptances as well, though it appears that this dis-
tinction is seldom necessary.24 In many instances, "irrevocable" can
be equated with "bindende." However, bindende 16ofter can vary greatly
in their effect in Norway. At times a bindende 16fte will be "irrevoca-
ble" in that only under exceptional circumstances will Norwegian
courts permit the promisor to call back his promise. 25 Then again,
the promisor may have freedom to recall his otherwise "binding"
promise, and the English term "revocable" is more appropriate. On
still other occasions, the legal status of the promise will fall some-
where between "irrevocable" and "revocable" as these words are
used in England and in the United States.26 Our terminology simply
does not provide us with precise terms, capable of connoting the var-
ious degrees of "binding" effect that a promise can have under Nor-
wegian law. 27
The quoted definitions must therefore be read as stating the ba-
sic rule of Norwegian law, that all promises bind the promisor, rec-
ognizing that the strength of these bonds may vary depending upon
the circumstances. Therefore, a binding promise in the Norwegian
sense may, but need not, equate with the Anglo-American concept of
irrevocability. This Article employs the terms "revocable" and "ir-
revocable" in their Anglo-American sense, where such usage accu-
rately reflects the substantive rule of Norwegian law. Where this is
not appropriate, this Article uses the term "binding" and attempts
by apt words to describe the exact meaning within the context.
Norwegian law is in accord with that of its Scandinavian neigh-
bors in enforcing what Anglo-American law might call "a naked
promise. ' 2 8 Article 1 in each of the Danish, Finnish, and Swedish
24 The mailbox rule, strictly applied, makes revocable acceptances a short-lived
species.
25 Indeed, the Schlesinger Report uses the term "irrevocable offer" to refer to the
analogous, though not identical, concept of "binding offer" in German law. See I SCHLES-
INGER 272, translating § 145 German Civil Code (BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB]). In
Norway, as this Article details, an offer first becomes impossible of revocation only upon
receipt by the offeree of actual notice of the offer. In Germany, an offeror may not revoke
his offer once the offeree has received the offer (though the offeror may not yet be aware
he has received it). Thus the term "irrevocable offer" is even less appropriate when ap-
plied to the Norwegian bindende tilbud. This is because of the longer period an offer may be
"in limbo" at Norwegian law.
26 The discussions infra at notes 133-50, 375-84 and accompanying text provide spe-
cific examples of the various amounts of "irrevocability" bindende Iofter can have.
27 This inadequacy of Anglo-American terminology is no doubt due to the basic dif-
ference in approach between the Norwegian "promise principle" of contracts and the
"contract principle" that lies at the heart of the Anglo-American law of contracts.
28 ARNHOLM PIH, supra note 15, at 50.
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Contract Codes 29 expressly states that tilbud og svar pd tilbud (offers
and answers to offers) are binding upon one who dispatches these
promises.30 Although the Norwegian Contract Code does not in-
clude this provision, commentators agree that this omission is due to
recognition of the promise principle's importance, which requires no
codification. 3' Iceland follows Norway's suit and does not codify the
"'obvious."32
The promise principle is not confined to Scandinavia, and in fact
probably comes to the North as part of the Germanic heritage of
these states. Austria, Germany, and Switzerland all possess some-
what similar versions of the legal principle. 33 France applies the
promise principle to commercial transactions but applies its counter-
part, the "contract principle," to private transactions. 34
The promise principle is subject to certain reservations. The
promise principle does not attach to declarations that a party does
not intend should have legal consequences.3 5 The principle does,
however, apply in the situation most important in the context of this
Article - where the promisor makes his promise conditional upon
the timely receipt of some form of acceptance.3 6
Where parties contemplate a relationship involving mutuality of
obligation, the promise of the first party to do an act is made condi-
tional upon the other party's promise to supply the quid pro quo.37
The inclusion of this condition converts a lofie (promise) to a tilbud
(offer).38 The promisor becomes bound to perform his promise only
upon receipt of the acceptance he demands.3 9 To this extent, the
29 See supra note 5 for a discussion of the formulation of the Scandinavian Contract
Codes. The Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Codes stem from a cooperative effort among
these states. The Finnish and Icelandic Codes came later but are patterned on the Norwe-
gian-Swedish-Danish model.
30 KNOPH, supra note 16, at 347. The various provisions of each Code, as applied by
the respective national judiciaries, define further what "binding" means with regard to a
specific promise. Sweden and Finland, for example, do not apply the promise principle to
sales of real property. Contracts, in a specific form, are required. See ARNHOLM PII, supra
note 15, at 49.
11 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 50; see also KNOPH, supra note 16, at 347.
:52 ARNHIOLM PII, supra note 15, at 50.
33 See ALLGEMEINES BIJRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH FOR DIE GESAMMTEN DEUTSCHEN ERB-
LANDER DER OESTERREICHISCHEN MONARCHIE [ABGB] § 862 (Austrian Civil Code), trans-
lated at I SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 269; BGB, supra note 25, § 145 (German Civil
Code), translated at I SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 272; SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATION-
ENRECHT [OR] Article 3 (Swiss Law of Obligations), translated at I SCHLESINGER, supra note
1, at 275; see also 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 46 n.56 (1950)[hereinafter
CORIN] for a brief comparison of the Anglo-American and Swiss and German systems
with regard to the irrevocability of offers.
34 See ARNIOLM PII, supra note 15, at 49.
35 See supra note 22 and accompanying text for Arnholm's definition.
3 6 ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 47.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 62.
39 See infra notes 365-78 and accompanying text for a complete exposition of this
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effect of a tilbud under the "promise principle" is not too different
from that of a revocable offer applying the contract principle. 40
The impact of the promise principle is felt not with regard to the
duty of the offeror to perform his promise, but rather on the duty of
the offeror to enter into the contract. Norwegian law, and that of
other systems applying the promise principle, add to the offer the
promise that the offeror will enter into a contract if the offeree ac-
cepts the offer. Norwegian law makes this promise irrevocable once
the offeree finds out about it.41 Normally, this occurs well before the
underlying promise of the offeror to perform becomes irrevocable
on his receipt of the acceptance.
Under Norwegian law, a promisor may reserve for himself a
power to revoke the promise implied at law to enter into a contract.
The offeror must do this explicitly, however, in the original prom-
ise-with the result that the offeror's declaration will no longer be
viewed as a true promise. 42
Having pinpointed the theoretical differences between these two
principles, the two may now be compared. This Article details the
promise principle as Norwegian courts apply it. In practice, Norwe-
gian courts achieve results not far different from those of Anglo-
American courts applying the contract principle; the differences are
certainly less than the theoretical underpinnings might suggest. This
similarity of result is due to the modifications both approaches have
necessarily undertaken to achieve reasonable results. If, under the
contract principle, one allows the parties to make an offer irrevoca-
ble by express provision (option contracts), while under the promise
principle the law allows one to expressly make promises sine obligo
(utenforbindtlighet), the whole question becomes upon whom one im-
poses the task of making the reservation. 43
It would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Schlesinger
Report to attempt here to debate the relative merits of each system.
Several critical observations, however, shed light on the reasoning
behind the promise principle. Arnholm notes that neither principle
can be called impractical in the face of so many years of effective
functioning. 44 Still, Arnholm argues, in certain instances the prom-
ise principle seems the better rule. As an example he uses the case
where the system provides for option contracts or, alternatively,
promises sine obligo, and a party neglects to make the appropriate res-
ervation. The question becomes whether the offeror should lose his
right of revocation as soon as the offeree finds out about the offer or
40 See, e.g., I CORBIN, supra note 33, § 38.
41 See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text for a complete exposition of this
rule.
42 See Avtl., supra note 6, for a codification of this rule.
43 ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 49.
44 Id. at 48.
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not until the offeree has managed to send off an acceptance. 45
Arnholm feels that in this situation it is more "natural" to apply
the promise principle and make the offer irrevocable as soon as the
offeree finds out about the offer.46 In partial support of this posi-
tion, Arnholm cites the infrequency with which Norwegians avail
themselves of opportunity to make their promises uten forbindtlighet
(sine obligo). By doing so, they would avoid the binding effect that
Norwegian law presumes promises possess, but they would also re-
duce their chances of concluding the contract. 47 A number of states
converted from the contract principle to the promise principle in the
eighteenth century, but no state has done the reverse. This also
speaks in favor of the promise principle. 48
Arnholm suggests that certain allowances may be made in the
promise principle for contracts made between closely associated par-
ties. 49 He points out that the contract principle is most naturally
suited to societal conditions in which parties meet to negotiate the
terms of their agreement, and that a requirement of formalities is
very often involved. In today's society, Arnholm asserts, contracts
are concluded between strangers over an expanse of distance and
time. Therefore, although the promise principle is probably the best
rule in such circumstances, Arnholm suggests that the rules ought to
bend where parties are in fact on close terms with one another.
Although Arnholm does not explicitly say so, this is probably a refer-
ence to certain provisions in the Norwegian Contract Code that af-
ford Norwegian courts a considerable measure of flexibility in
applying the rules that follow from the promise principle. 50
III. The Concept of Fordring in the Law of Contracts and Obli-
gations in Norway
As will be seen elsewhere in this Article, the concept of afordring
45 Arnholm notes that the same question arises where a system does not allow such
reservation. He cites no examples in support of his statement. See ARNHOLM PII, supra
note 15, at 49.
46 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 43. Arnholm does not spell out exactly why he
feels this result is more "natural." Perhaps he means because one avoids the difficult
questions of reliance with which Anglo-American courts must grapple. Perhaps, too, "nat-
ural" can be equated with "familiar."
47 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 49. Arnholm evidently believes that were revocable
promises such a good idea, Norwegians would make use of the right Avl § 9 affords them.
They could then make all their promises "non-binding." One suspects Arnholm is
describing a custom of trade rather than a conscious choice between alternatives.
48 Id. Arnholm unfortunately gives no clue as to which states he is referring.
4) Id.
50 See, e.g., AvIl., supra note 6, §§ 4.2, 6.2, 9, 32, 33. Avl. § 39 is particularly impor-
tant because it opens the door to considerable flexibility by courts in dealing with difficult
cases between closely associated parties. See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the effects of this rule. Even more important since 1983 is Ail. § 36, which
gives the courts even broader discretion. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
figures prominently in Norwegian law.5 ' It is necessary, therefore, to
pause at the outset and define this concept.
Enfordring is defined as "a legally enforceable right of payment
or delivery of a performance in money, goods or other things of
value.... Afordring can be created by contract or by the breach of a
legal duty .... "52 Because Norway applies the promise principle,
the offeree, by virtue of the offer, acquires a right to create a con-
tract. Most often the offer will contain a promise to perform or not
perform a certain act at a later time. When this is the case, the right
acquired by the offeree is in the nature of enfordring.5 3
As this Article will detail, the offeree acquires this right at a
point in time prior to his acceptance. This means that the body of
law concerning fordringer - essentially the law of contract enforce-
ment - is brought into play at that time. The discussion in this Arti-
cle will make apparent that in many cases this leads to results quite
different from those achieved under the contract principle as it oper-
ates in Anglo-American law.
II. Report on Norway
A. Offer
A-i. Offer or Invitation to Deal
I. Distinction Recognized
The Report found that the distinction between an offer and an
invitation to deal was recognized by all the legal systems it consid-
ered. The differentiation appears in Norwegian contract law as well,
and is codified by the Norwegian Contract Code.54 The distinction is
crucial in Norwegian law, as once an offer has become effective it is
binding on the offeror. Norwegians refer to this as the promise prin-
ciple (lofte prinsippet).5 5
51 See infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
52 GULBRANSEN, supra note 21, at 73.
53 See P. AUGDAHL, DEN NORDSKE OBILGASJONSRETrS ALMINDELIGE DEL (The General
Law of Obligations in Norway) 1, 5 (5th ed. 1978)[hereinafter AUGDAHL]. The citation to
AUGDAHL is significant. In Norway, scholars have divided the law of contracts into two
sections: Avtalerett (roughly, the law of contract formation); and Obligasjonsrett (the law of
contract enforcement, also including a number of commercial law topics). As its title indi-
cates, Schlesinger's Report limits the scope of its inquiry to contract formation. To answer
the questions the Report poses for Norwegian contract formation, it is necessary to go also
to the law of Norwegian contract enforcement. As this Article details, the operation of the
promise principle causes offers to become irrevocable (and thus create an enforceable
right in the offeree) at a point earlier in the give-and-take process of contract negotiations
than where the contract principle is involved. In this sense, Schlesinger's chosen title,
Formation of Contracts, is less universal than it should be.
54 AvtL, supra note 6, § 9.
55 All of Scandinavia (Germany as well) follows this so-called promise principle. It
provides that one is normally bound by one's unilateral promises. Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden each made explicit provision for this in the first section of their respective contract
codes. Norway did not do so, as this rule of law was considered so settled that codification
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Norwegian law recognizes that the distinction between offer and
invitation to deal often depends on circumstance and interpretation.
Nevertheless, the law seems to reflect a clear feeling that if a person
who makes a proposal wants to avoid being bound by it, that person
must give the proposal a form that leaves no doubt that it is not
meant to bind its giver, but only to invite offers. This rule perhaps
has as its source the promise principle.
II. Clear Proposals
Norwegian law provides that a person may make it clear, by ap-
propriate language, whether he or she intends to make an offer
(tilbud) or an invitation to deal (oppfordring til d gjbre et tilbud). Courts
normally give effect to such a clear intention. Section 9.1 of the Con-
tract Code specifically provides that the use of the words utenforbind-
tlighet (without prejudice), uten obligo (without obligation), or their
equivalent, in a proposal that would otherwise be viewed as an offer,
will instead be viewed as an invitation to deal. 56 Such an invitation
to deal, however, may ripen into an acceptance if offers are received
in response to it.5 7
III. Unclear Proposals
Where a person has not used such words as to make clear his
intention, Norwegian contract law recognized that drawing the line
between offers and invitations to deal may on occasion be difficult.
Specific rules of law exist to guide certain factual situations such as
those involving pricelists or advertisements. In other situations, Nor-
wegian courts identify a number of factors whose presence or ab-
sence will be taken into consideration in deciding what to call a given
proposal.
A. Use of Vague or Uncertain Terms
Where a proposal is couched in uncertain terms, Norwegian
courts occasionally find no offer at all. 58 Courts, however, do define
was unnecessary. Nevertheless, the principle clearly forms the basis of Avtl §§ 5, 7 and 39.
Iceland has followed Norway's lead in this regard. See KNOPH, supra note 16, at 344-46.
56 It appears, however, that Norwegians seldom avail themselves of this language.
Carl Jacob Arnholm suggests that this is perhaps because parties feel that though they may
avoid being bound by using such language, they also reduce the likelihood of their creat-
ing a contract. C.J. ARNHOLM, LAEREBOK: AVTALERETr 43 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
ARNHOLM].
57 See infra the discussion of implied acceptance at notes 263-93 and accompanying
text. Avtl. § 9.2 provides that if an offer is received in response to an invitation to deal as
per § 9. 1, and the recipient ought to be aware of this, he is to let the offeror know, without'
unnecessary delay, if he is going to accept the offer. Otherwise, .47vtl. § 9.3 provides that
the offer will be viewed as accepted.
58 Rettstidene (Norway's Supreme Court case reporter series)[hereinafter R1.] 1924 at
929. When A was in financial trouble and B, his stepfather, wrote to creditor C and re-
quested a statement of A's debt, saying, "then we'll see what we can do," C sent B the
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the missing elements if it is at all possible to do so. 59
B. Words of Reservation
Words of reservation are clearly authorized with regard to limit-
ing an offer to a mere invitation to deal.60 Norwegian law also recog-
nizes that a proposer may make it clear by explicit language that his
proposal is an offer but may be recalled at any time. 6'
Norwegian law distinguishes from both of the above, however,
proposals containing a qualifier such as "upon the condition of no
change in the market price." Such proposals are viewed as offers
with a special condition (lofter med saerlige betingelser), but the offeror is
still bound by the terms of the offer.62
C. A Proposal Addressed to Several People but to be Accepted
by only One
A proposal addressed to several people but to be accepted by
only one person may be so vague that a Norwegian court will not
view it as a binding offer at all, but rather as a "feeler" and an invita-
tion to deal. 63 Where the recipient of the proposal has little factual
material on which to build his case, courts go quite far in allowing
the person making the proposal to withdraw it. They also allow the
use of a "strawman" to accept an offer to void it to others.64
D. Reliance
In Norwegian law, like German law, one should not overempha-
size the reliance principle as a factor in determining what to call a
proposal. Norwegian law recognizes the 'culpa in contrahendo' con-
cept (negativ kontrakts interesse). It has been suggested that even a
non-binding invitation to enter contractual negotiations may contain
an implied promise to refund to the other party the expenses in-
curred in preparing a detailed offer. One should remember that
under section 9 of the Contract Code an invitation to deal may ripen
into an acceptance. 65
statement and indicated that he had given A a due date both imminent and inflexible. B
answered, "Sorry, this cannot be arranged as quickly as tomorrow, but you can be sure
that it will be taken care of right away." Held: neither statement was an offer.
59 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 46-47.
6o See Avtl., supra note 6, § 9; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
i1 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 42.
62 Id. at 46.
("3 Id. at 51-52.
64 Id. at 52. The law is settled, however, with regard to stocks and bonds offered on
the stock market; these may not be conditionally called back.
65 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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E. Prior Dealings
One may infer from prior dealings whether a proposal should be
construed as an offer. 66
F. Price Quotes
A mere inquiry into the price of specific merchandise is not gen-
erally an offer. A more difficult question is whether a price quotation
in response to an inquiry should be viewed as an offer. The language
of section 9 suggests that, at least in certain cases, a mere price quote
should be viewed as an offer. An example might be an "invitation to
deal" within the meaning of section 9, requesting offers in the form
of a price.
IV Special Rules for Particular Situations
A. Advertisements and Pricelists
Courts are not likely to view either advertisements or pricelists
as offers in Norway, even if prices and conditions are given as care-
fully and completely as they would be in a regular letter of offer.67
Nevertheless, courts may well construe an advertisement to be an
invitation to deal, based on the language of section 9. Similarly, no
bar exists to a seller's explicitly declaring an advertisement to be an
offer - for example, by using language like "first come, first serve"
or "as long as supplies last". 68 Pricelists are generally not offers
even if sent out with cover letters. Pricelists may, however, consti-
tute offers in the course of an ongoing business relationship. 69
B. Articles in Shop Windows
A price tag attached to an object is probably a binding offer.
Norwegian law considers this a borderline situation. 70
C. Self-Service Systems
Norwegian law concerning self-service systems is unsettled. The
trend seems to be towards viewing an object on display with a price
tag as an offer, and allowing customers to make that offer binding by
picking up the item. 7' A contract is certainly concluded when the
66 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 46. His comments here would likely benefit from sup-
plementation by ARNHOLM PHI, supra note 15.
67 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 46.
(68 But Norwegian law probably views an advertised promise of reward to be a binding
offer. Avl. § 14 provides that a statement of agency made public through advertising is
also binding.
69 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 46.
70 Id. at 46.
71 KNOPII, supra note 16, at 345-47; see also ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 56. 100; R1.
1978 at 702.
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customer pays for the item.
D. Automatic Vending Machines
Norwegian law appears settled that placing items in automatic
vending machines amounts to making binding offers capable of be-
coming contracts on acceptance by the customers putting the money
in the machine. 72
E. Sending of Goods to a Person Who Never Ordered Them
Little pertinent authority exists on this point. Arnholm does
mention such situations at several points, 73 but does not state clearly
whether such mailings should be construed as offers.
A-2. Sales at Auction
L General Rules
Norwegian law recognizes sales by auction. The Norwegian
Code contains no specific provisions as to the conclusion of a con-
tract at an auction sale.
The question of whether a mere announcement of an auction
sale constitutes an offer is not discussed in the Norwegian system.
Such an announcement might constitute an invitation to deal with
the consequences provided by section 9 of the Contract Code.7 4
There is no discussion in the Norwegian Code of an auctioneer's
ability to turn his or her proposal into an offer through the use of
appropriate words. The presumption in Norwegian law, therefore, is
definitely that one who puts things up for auction makes no offer by
so doing. 75 The bids received at an auction, on the other hand, are
viewed as binding offers. 76 The auctioneer is not bound, however,
until he or she can be said to have finally accepted a bid. 77
II. Request for Bids and Tenders
Norwegian law does not consider requests for bids and tenders
(lisitasjoner) to be offers.78
72 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 56; see also KNOPH, supra note 16, at 304. Knoph makes
the same reservation in note 71, supra.
73 See, e.g., ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 180-81.
74 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
75 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 57.
76 Id. Arnholm notes that auctions require the setting of contractual conditions
through special means, because the bidders only mention a price, and so that the auction
can proceed with bid and overbid. Id.
77 The discretion of the auctioneer is clearly suggested by Lov. 14 aug. No. 3 om
offentlige auktioner og licitationer § 11.2 (Public Auctions and Bids Code). This law also
contains a number of other procedural rules regarding sale at auction. See also Lov. 18 des
1959 No. 11, Kapitel 4 and I I (Bidding Fees Code).
78 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 57; see also Lov. 14 aug. No. 3, Lov. 18 des. 1959.
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A-3. Definitions of Terms
I. Scope
Section A-i presented the state of Norwegian law on the signifi-
cance of the definiteness of a proposal in determining whether a pro-
posal is intended as an offer or as an invitation to deal. This section
looks at Norwegian law where a genuine offer, intended to be bind-
ing, is made in indefinite terms.
II. Two Situations Distinguished
Norwegian law provides that, in order for a proposal to lead to a
valid contract, the proposal must contain an adequate statement of
its terms. Rules of law determine whether there has been an ade-
quate statement of these terms.
The Report distinguishes two types of situations-first, propos-
als where there is a clear gap concerning a vital element; and second,
proposals where there is no gap but some standard or mechanism is
to be employed in determining one of the elements. In the second
instance, questions arise concerning whether the standard or mech-
anism provides the requisite definiteness. The Norwegian rules may
also be approached in this manner.
III. Offer Not Referring to a Gap-Filling Device
Norwegian law clearly allows courts to fill gaps in contractual
language, including the language of offers. The discretion of Norwe-
gian courts is very broad in this regard, and is very different from
Anglo-American law on this point. 79
Norwegian law contains declaratory rules capable of gap-filling
for specific types of contracts. These various statutes specifically
provide that the rules contained therein must be followed where a
contract is silent regarding certain provisions.8 0 Case law extends
this notion to instances where a contract provides for a situation but
the contract's meaning is unclear.8 1 The rules also extend to situa-
tions where it is unclear whether a contract makes provision for the
circumstances or not.8 2
Norwegian law also allows courts, where appropriate:
1) To read into contractual language certain well-defined terms
used in transactions of the same kind, regardless of whether a subjec-
79 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 37; see also K. HUSER, AVTrALETOLKNING 488
(1983)[hereinafter HUSER]. HUSER is a lengthy treatise on all aspects of contract interpre-
tation in Norway. On interpretation of offers, see, e.g., Rt. 1921 at 259.
80 See, e.g., Lov. om kjop av 24 mai 1907 No. 2, § i; Lov. om kommission, handel-
sagentur og handelsreisende av 30 juni 1916 No. 1 § 1 (Maritime Code); Lov. om
Sjofarten av 20juli 1893 No. I § 72 (Commission Sales Code).
81 RI. 1960 at 1055; Rt. 1924 at 68.
82 R1. 1929 at 1081; Rt. 1947 at 705.
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tive approach would reach the same result.8 3
2) To fill the gap according to a very general standard of rea-
sonableness where clear rules do not exist. Norwegians view the
price paid as an important factor to be considered in
interpretation .84
3) To fill the gap according to the circumstances of each case.
Recent court decisions hold that courts may go .very far in this re-
gard. 85 Courts are not completely free to act, however. A judge
must employ what support is to be found in legislative considera-
tions of a subject previously recognized as relevant to contract law.
He or she may also be required to consider analogous rules gov-
erning related contractual conditions. 86 One recent case, however,
allowed the judge to evaluate a case only on its particular facts, with-
out setting up any definitive rules, in seeking the most reasonable
solution. 87
Norwegian law recognizes the validity of contracts that leave it
to one of the parties to fill the gap in a fair and equitable manner.
Courts may intervene where unreasonableness appears likely, and
the discretion of Norwegian courts is very broad, by English or
American standards, in this regard. 88
IV Offer Referring to Gap-Filling Device
The Report distinguishes several situations:
A. References to a Standard
No pertinent authority is available on this point. Nevertheless, it
seems likely, based on the broad discretion afforded the parties, that
Norwegian courts would allow such incorporation by reference.
Norwegian policy clearly upholds agreements wherever possible.
Even the lack of a definite price will seldom be fatal, because often
83 See HUSER, supra note 79, at 532-39; see also Avtl., supra note 6, § 1, which provides
that courts are to apply the rules of the Contract Code, unless the acts of the parties, usage
of the trade or custom provide other rules. A literal translation is found infra at note 140.
84 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 35; see also KNOPH, supra note 16, at 445. See, e.g., Lov.
24 mai 1907 No. 2 om Kj6b § 5.
85 R1. 1972 at 449; Rt. 1968 at 783.
8 KNoPII, supra note 16, at 460-61.
87 Rt. 1973 at 887. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 34-36, suggests the broad parameters
of this discretion. A judge may consider the language-read dialect-of parties, a very
significant factor in highly regionalized Norwegian society. Judges may also consider: ne-
gotiations prior to the agreement; prior agreements between the parties; and the subse-
quent behavior of the parties.
88 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 47-48, cites numerous examples of this from case law.
The Price Code, (Lov. 26juni 1953 No. 4 om kontrol og regulering av priser, utbytte og
konkurranse folhold, 40-41) contains rules on this subject; see also Falkanger, En Sammen-
ligning melloni engelske og norske prinstipper for fortolkning av konfrakter, 9 ARKIV FOR SJ6RETr 537,
561-62, 565 (1969).
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one possesses some means of determining price.89
B. Determination by a Party
Norwegian courts are willing to go quite far here, but a determi-
nation by a party must not be unreasonable.90 Parties may give such
discretion to themselves. In the absence of agreement, rules of law
may give the discretion to one of the parties.9 '
C. Reference to a Future Agreement
Norwegian courts will evidently also go quite far in this direc-
tion. 92 The trend is to hold the contract valid on its terms and direct
the parties to negotiate a reasonable agreement on the unsettled
issues.
V Section 32 of Norwegian Contract Code
Section 32 of the Norwegian Contract Code figures prominently
in a number of cases involving contract interpretation. It provides:
One who has dispatched a declaration of will, which due to
faulty penmanship or other similar error on his side, has been given
a different intent than intended, is not bound by the contents of its
declaration, if the person to whom the declaration is dispatched, re-
alized or ought to have realized, that an error had occurred.
Ifa declaration of will is distorted through faulty telegraphy, the
person who has dispatched it will not be bound by the declaration in
the form it has when it is received.
The same is true, if an oral declaration, sent by messenger, is
received in a distorted form.
If the distortion is due to fault on the side of the declarant, he is
bound to compensate the recipient for losses caused by the error.
If the declarant becomes aware of the distortion, and he wishes
to rely upon it, he must give the other party notice of this without
undue delay. If he does not give such notice, the declaration will be
valid as received, if the other party did not know or ought not to
have known of the distortion.93
Section 32 falls outside the specified focus of the Report in that
the statute applies where mechanical difficulties have obscured what
was the once clearly stated intent of the parties. The Report, how-
ever, concerns itself with cases where the intent of the parties was
unclear ab initio. Because these two areas may well overlap, the im-
portance of section 32 cannot be overlooked.
89 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 47.
90 The Norwegian term is ubillig, the literal translation of which implies commercial
reasonableness: "not-inexpensive" or "un-economic."
9 1 See, e.g., Kj6psloven (Sales Code) § 5, regarding price; § 13 regarding time of per-
formance; see also ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 47-48.
92 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 64.
93 Avil., supra note 6, § 32.
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A-4. Offers Calling for a Promise and Offers Calling for an Act
Norwegian law recognizes the distinction between offers calling
for a promise and offers calling for an act. There is no special name
for a contract that results from an offer calling for a promise. A con-
tract resulting from an act in response to an offer does have a special
tag-realkontrakt. The essential difference between contracts result-
ing from acceptance of one or the other type of offer relates to the
act of acceptance.9 4
A-5. Offer for One Entire Contract or for Several Contracts
No pertinent authority is available on this point. Perhaps, like
German law, the Norwegian system is not concerned with this prob-
lem. Norwegian courts likely do as their German counterparts and
treat the question of whether an offer is meant to propose an entire
contract or a series of separate contracts as a matter of
interpretation.
Norwegian law does recognize the concept of rammeavtale (liter-
ally, "frame contract"). Here, the individual parties set down com-
mon provisions for a series of contracts that they expect to enter into
in a certain period.9 5 Norwegian courts have also shown themselves
willing to find an offer definite enough to form the basis of a con-
tract where the offeree retains considerable latitude as to quantity or
time of delivery. Perhaps because Norwegian courts possess such
broad interpretive discretion, they are always able to decide this is-
sue based on the facts of an individual case.
A-6. Parties to Contract.- Complete or Partial Identity of Offeror
and Offeree
Little pertinent authority is available concerning complete iden-
tity of offeror and offeree. Arnholm says only that in older theory one
viewed it as a logical impossibility that a person could enter into a
contract with himself. Unfortunately, he goes on to distinguish self-
contracting by an agent, and never returns to state the current Nor-
wegian law in this regard. 9"
Norwegian law distinguishes two situations: 1) Self-dealing,
(Selvkontrakering), where the agent, (fullmektigen), representing his
principal, (fullmaktsgiveren), contracts with himself as an individual;
and 2) dual agency, (kombinasjon), where the agent of two or more
principals effects a contract between them9 7 This distinction ap-
pears to be largely linguistic, and the law in this area is unsettled,
94 See infra notes 312-39 and accompanying text.
95 KNoPH, supra note 16, at 330.
96 ARNIHOLM, supra note 56, at 141.
97 Id.
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with both self-dealing and dual agency addressed on a case-by-case
basis.
Arnholm says that it is clear that an agent cannot be given total
freedom in either circumstance, but neither can one absolutely for-
bid such transactions. Arnholm suggests that Norwegian courts
solve problems here by examining the power of the individual agent
in light of the circumstances surrounding the contract in dispute. He
names several relevant factors to be considered: Whether all parties
consented; whether the agreements were specialized or mere formal-
ities; and whether bankruptcy is contemplated. 98
A-7. Offers to the Public
Norwegian law recognizes that an offer can be directed to the
public at large.9 9 Norwegian law provides that an offer to the public
that does not involve a reward may be treated as a real offer provided
that it meets the other requirements of an offer.' 00 The difference
here is that the offer in this case can be accepted by persons not
named in the text of the offer. Norwegian law recognizes that great
difficulties can arise in deciding where to draw the line in such in-
stances. The difference here is that the offer in this case can be
accepted by persons not named in the text of the offer. Norwegian
law recognizes that great difficulties can arise in deciding Where to
draw the line in such instances. Arnholm suggests that as soon as
such an offer is made public, it should become binding.10' In regard
to making sure that no one accepts the offer in the future, he sug-
gests that one might use by analogy the rule of section 14 of the Con-
tract Code. That rule provides that where one advertises a statement
of agency, a binding offer by law, one may legally recall that state-
ment from future operation by the publication of a retraction.10 2
In Norway, one who promises a reward to anyone for perform-
ing a certain act is viewed as bound. 10 3 It is not clear, however, when
one is bound-upon publication, upon receipt by some person capa-
ble of accepting the offer, or upon actual acceptance. Arnholm sug-
gests that it is probably binding on publication. 10 4
In some circumstances, Norwegian law will hold an offeror
bound immediately. It is unclear whether a similar rule would be, by
analogy, followed in cases where an act is performed without knowl-
edge of the promise to give a reward for such act. Arnholm seems to
98 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 142.
99 Id. at 46.
100 See supra notes 54-73, 80-93 and accompanying text.
101 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 44.
102 Id. at 48-49, 160.
103 Id. at 46.
104 Id. at 44, 46.
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favor binding the offeror on publication.' 0 5
Section 14 could probably be applied analogously to revocation
of offers of rewards.' 0 6
A-8. Communication of the Offer
I. Communication of Offer Necessary
To be effective as an offer, a proposal must be intended to be
communicated, and must in fact be communicated to the offeree.1
0 7
A. Phases of Communication, Inter Absentes: Dispatch, Re-
ceipt, Actual Notice
A proposal that has not yet been dispatched (avgitt) - for exam-
ple, one left on the desk of its author is not yet an effective offer.
108
Actual dispatch also does not normally make an offer binding.' 0 9 In
Norwegian law, the general rule is that an offer is not effective until it
has "come to the knowledge" of the addressee (kommet til adressatens
kunnskap).'' 0 Mere receipt of the offer by the offeree will not usually
suffice to make an offer binding on the offeror."
105 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
107 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 44. But a stock offering is binding once it is placed on
the list of offerings. Money placed in a church collection box or a blind beggar's hat
cannot be taken back just because the offeree was not yet aware of his good fortune. Also,
it may be Norwegian law does not hold this to be true regarding offers to the general
public.
108 Id. at 44. Arnholm states, as well, that even if an employee of the offeror finds a
signed letter offering her a raise in the offeror's out-basket, the letter will not be viewed as
a binding offer. Id.
109 Id. at 80. Note, however, that a different rule applies to what Norwegians call a
"reklamasjon." Reklamasjon is defined as follows, "A declaration of one of the parties that
he has an objection to the object of the contract, its delivery, or other conditions regarding
the performance of the other party" (this author's translation). GULBRANSEN, supra note
21, at 175. A reklamasjon secures the right of its author when it is responsibly dispatched.
(forsvarlig avsendt). AvItl., supra note 6, § 40. Compare Kj6psl. § 6 1, (Sales Code), Koml. § 3
(Commissions Code), with og FAL § 33.1 (Insurance Contracts Code). Norwegian courts
appear to have been somewhat troubled by the mildness of this standard. See ARNHOLM,
supra note 56, at 82. A different standard has been imposed in at least one instance.
Where a buyer has purchased something "on approval" and is required by Kj6psl. § 61 to
notify the seller that he does not wish to keep the item, his notice must be received by the
buyer to be effective.
I ") ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 48. This rule is codified, in effect, byAvtl., supra note 6,
§ 7, regarding revocation of an offer. A revocation is effective, Avitl. § 7 provides, if it is
received by the other party before or at the same time the offer comes to the offeree's
knowledge.
I I I The problem of the point in time at which the offer becomes effective is discussed
iifra at notes 119-24. Note, however, that this rule does not apply to what Norwegians call
a "p5bud," defined as follows: "A legal act that is binding upon its addresseefi'om the very
instait it is received, that is, when it is placed in a position where the addressee has or ought
to have familiarized himself with it, e.g., when a notice of termination of employment is
put in his postbox." GULBRANSEN, supra note 21, at 169 (translation and emphasis by this
author). Note also that Norwegian law has recognized certain exceptions to the "actual
knowledge" rule with regard to proposals in the form of promises (Io6er) and offers (tilbud).
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B. Regular and Irregular Communication
When the would-be offeror willingly dispatches the message, it
may reach the addressee either in the intended manner of communi-
cation or some different way. When the message arrives in its in-
tended form, it becomes an effective offer.
When the message arrives in a different manner, legal conse-
quences may follow in at least one area of the law. Section 2.1 of the
Contract Code requires that where the offeror has set a deadline for
an acceptance, he or she must have received that acceptance before
the deadline has passed. Section 2.2 provides further:
If the offer is made by letter, the day of the deadline is figured
from the day the letter is dated. If the offer is made by telegram, the
time of the deadline is figured from the instant it, the telegram, is
turned in at the telegraph station of the place of dispatch. 112
Deadlines are thus apparently bound to the manner of commu-
nication originally chosen by the offeror.
Norwegian law does not otherwise seem to have been much con-
cerned with communication of an offer, although section 33 of the
Contract Code may well set out the basic rule for solving disputes in
this area. It provides:
Even if a declaration of will otherwise would be viewed as valid,
it will not bind the one who has given it, if because of circumstances
which existed at the time the other party gained knowledge of the
declaration, and to which it may be assumed he was aware (rnd
antas),i i3 it would run counter to good faith or conscionability (rede-
lighet) should he, the other party, seek to bring the declaration into
force. 114
Where the addressee may be assumed to know at the time of
receipt that the communication of his offer has been irregular, sec-
tion 33 seems to provide clear authority for Norwegian courts to
loose the offeror from his bonds. Furthermore, even where the ad-
dressee gains such knowledge after receipt of the offer, courts may
intervene. Section 39 here expands upon section 33. Section 39
provides that if special reasons demand it, (saerlige grunde tilsiger det)
courts may take into consideration the fact that the addressee has
knowledge or ought to have acquired knowledge"15 of the circum-
stances, after receipt of the offer but before he has changed his posi-
tion in reliance upon it.' 16
112 Avil., supra note 6, § 2.2.
113 The use of md antas is significant. It clearly suggests a standard of proof higher
than that of burde ha skjont, "ought to have realized". The nid antas formulation does fall
short of requiring any exact proof. See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 254.
114 Avl., supra note 6, § 33.
115 Note that Avtl. § 39 uses the lesser standard here. See supra note 113.
116 See infra note 127 and accompanying text for a complete translation and more ex-
tensive discussion.
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II. Identical Cross-Offers
Arnholm seems to view the identical cross-offer situation essen-
tially as a variant on the more common situation of ongoing negotia-
tions where it can be difficult to identify one party as offeror and the
other as offeree.' 17 In practice, he continues, business people will
usually skirt the dilemma. One party or the other will affirm the
agreement. But, Arnholm maintains, the two offers are in and of
themselves actually sufficient to constitute a valid contract.' 18 No
other pertinent authority is available at present to confirm Arnholm's
assertion. Nevertheless, the preeminence of the Arnholm text does
make it likely that Arnholm correctly states Norwegian law in this
regard.
A-9. When Offer Becomes Effective
I. Offers Made to the Public at Large
Norwegian law appears to be similar to German law in that it
requires that a distinction be drawn between promises made to the
public and individual offers communicated to ascertainable per-
sons.' 19 Norwegian law apparently agrees with German law that
such offers are effective upon publication. 120
II. Oral Offers Made to Ascertained Persons
Offers made inter praesentes, that is by word of mouth, including
through use of the telephone, present few problems. Here, as in the
Report, suffice it to say that such offers are recognized in Norway. z1 2
III. Offers Made Inter Absentes to Ascertained Persons: Pertinent
Rules of Law
A. Power of Acceptance
By implication, section 7 of the Contract Code makes clear in its
rule regarding revocation that an offer is not binding until it has
"come to the knowledge" of its addressee. 122 Some exceptions to
117 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 57.
118 Id.
I 1I I SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 729.
12o The Norwegian term utloveLse, used to describe such offers, is clearly a "Norwegi-
anization" of the German Auslobung. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
121 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 44, 48. In Norwegian shipping circles, there is an
ongoing debate as to whether shipping contracts entered into by Telex should be consid-
ered inter praesentes or inter absentes agreements. Complicating the issue are significant dif-
ferences between Norwegian and Anglo-American law regarding agents and personal
contracts. The problems presented here are discussed in some detail in P. GRAM,
FRAKTAVTALER 36-41 (4th ed. 1977) (Freight Agreements).
122 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the language
of the statute. Note that Norwegian law does not require the offeree to have detailed
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this rule, however, have been recognized. 123 Some offers set a spe-
cific deadline for acceptance. Where such a deadline is not set out,
Contract Code section 3 provides guidelines for determining a rea-
sonable time for acceptance. In either case, if the offer does not
reach the offeree before this time has elapsed, the offeror will appar-
ently no longer be held to his offer. 124
B. Revocation
The general rule of Norwegian law is codified by section 7 of the
Contract Code:
If an offer ... is recalled, this recall is effective if it reaches the
other party before or at the same time the offer . . . comes to his
knowledge. 125
This statute requires no more than that the revocation reach
(kommetfrem) the addressee in time.126
On occasion, Norwegian law will afford an offeror a further right
of revocation. It is here that section 39 serves its intended purpose.
The statute provides:
When under this law the power of a proposal [viljeserklaering] to
bind is contingent upon the fact that the other party did not know or
ought not to have known or is otherwise deemed to be in good faith,
this goes to the point in time when the proposal came to his knowl-
edge. Nevertheless, where special reasons so demand, the fact may
be taken into consideration that he has or ought to have acquired
knowledge of the circumstances after this point in time, but before
he has changed his position in reliance on it.1 2 7
Section 39 concerns an addressee seeking a stronger position
than he otherwise would have, based on his good faith. It may well
be reasonable in such cases to take into account knowledge later ac-
quired by him. Nevertheless, this need not mean that the same rule
should apply where the offeror wishes to recall his offer.
Still, the law presupposes that a similar rule is to be applied to
revocations, and this is the reason behind the careful language of
information regarding the contents of the offer. Rather, it requires only that he under-
stand that he has received a certain promise. ARNIHOLM, supra note 56, at 49.
123 See supra note 107.
124 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 60.
125 Avl., supra note 6, § 7 (translation by author).
126 Norwegian law is evidently quite close to Swiss law in this regard, but at variance
with German law where the time of actual knowledge is immaterial.
127 Avil., supra note 6, § 39. Norwegian law allowed an expanded right of revocation,
corresponding to that of § 39 even before the incorporation of this statute into the Code.
If the revocation occurred re integra-before anything had happened-the addressee had to
accept this.
Such a rule, of course, significantly narrows the difference between a system employ-
ing the promise-principle (like Norway) and one employing the contract principle (like the
United States). This is particularly so in light of the effect of option contracts upon revoca-
bility in systems based on the contract principle. For a further discussion, see KNOPli,
supra note 16, at 343-46; see also ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 41-45.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
section 7 of the Contract Code.' 2 8
That statute provides only that a revocation is effective if it
reaches the addressee before or at the same time as the offer comes
to his knowledge; it does not preclude the possibility that occasion-
ally a revocation may reach still further forward in time. Arnholm
advises caution in this area. He points out that section 39 on its face
only authorizes revocation before the addressee has changed his po-
sition in response to the offer, and suggests that one would have to
speak of a rather short period of time. Furthermore, a showing of
some special excuse for his change of heart perhaps should be re-
quired of the offeror. Arnholm expresses serious doubts that sec-
tion 39 could ever be applied to investment contracts involving price
speculation. He also asserts that higher demands will generally be
required in the field of commercial activities than in the private sec-
tor. Nevertheless, he concludes, section 39 gives courts access to a
purely subjective brand of decision-making in this area.12 9
The ability of Norwegian courts to intervene in contracts to re-
solve issues such as this has recently been further expanded. In
1983, the former text of section 36 of the Contract Code was entirely
replaced.' 30 Before 1983, section 36 governed liquidated damages
and permitted their modification.' 3 1 New section 36, on the other
hand, gives courts broad discretion to set aside or reform any provi-
sion of a contract, if enforcing the contract according to its terms
would be unreasonable or violative of good business practices.' 32
The explicit authority to alter contracts that section 36 now
gives courts is broader than any such grant Norwegian courts had
previously exercised. 133 The travaux prparatoires of section 36 directs
128 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 50. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
129 The following cases are on point: R1. 1916 at 1154 (pre-Code); Rt. 1926 at 597;
R1. 1964 at 1260; and Rt. 1966 at 292.
130 Denmark and Sweden had previously amended the corresponding sections of their
contract codes in a similar fashion. K. HUSER, AVTALESENSUR (Modification of Contracts)
19 (1984)[hereinafter HUSER I1].
131 Previously, the section gave courts the authority under certain specified circum-
stances to reduce stipulated amounts of penalties or liquidated damages that proved to be
economically unreasonable.
132 Section 36 now provides:
An agreement may be entirely or partially set aside or altered to the
extent it would seem to be unreasonable or violative of good commercial
practices to enforce it (according to its terms). The same is true for unilater-
ally binding dispositions.
In this decision, taken into account shall not be only the contents of the
contract, the positions of the parties, and conditions prevailing at the time
the agreement was entered into, but also conditions that have arisen subse-
quently and to the other circumstances in general.
The rules in the first and second subparagraphs shall apply correspond-
ingly whenever it would seem to be unreasonable to employ customs of a
trade, or other contractual custom or usage.
Avil., supra note 6, § 36 (translation by author).
133 See HUSER II, supra note 130, at 12.
[VOL. 12
1987] FORMATION OF CONTRACTS:'THE LAW IN NORWAY
Norwegian courts to be conservative in their exercise of this broad
statutory discretion and to continue to take their departure point in
pre-existing statutes and case law.134 One commentator opines that
courts are likely to adhere to this directive, at least for now.' 3 5 An-
other commentator forecasts significant changes in contract law as a
result of section 36, however, and urges attorneys to make aggressive
use of it.
136
Section 36 clearly gives courts additional flexibility to deal with
such problems as delayed revocations, as well as other problems of
contract formation.' 37 It is too soon to say what concrete effects will
follow from the flexibility that section 36 allows. No instances in
which section 36 has been applied to resolve the problems raised by
a late revocation could be found; however, case law and commentary
surrounding section 36 should be examined carefully in the future
when examining any issue of Norwegian contract law.
C. Reliance Damages
Norwegian law would seem to be in agreement with German
law 138 that the offeree can claim no reliance damages if the offer did
not come to his attention before the deadline for acceptance. Where
the offeree has found out about an offer through an unauthorized
person he will also be entitled to no reliance damages.139
IV. Pertinent Provisions in the Offer
Norwegian law permits the offeror to make specific provisions in
the offer that will make the offer effective at a time later or earlier
than the times provided in sections 7 and 39. These rules are de-
rived from the Contract Code: section 1 makes it clear that all the
rules contained therein are to serve a declaratory function only. 140
A-JO. Revocable and Irrevocable Offers
I. Preliminary Observations
The Report views the problem of revocation as occurring only
after the offer has become effective. In Norway, it appears that sec-
tion 39, along with its forerunner, the re integra rule, allows a nar-
rowly circumscribed right of revocation of a binding offer, within the
meaning of "revocation" as used by the Report. Yet this right seems
134 KNOPH, supra note 16, at 512.
135 Id.
134 HUSER II, supra note 130, at 62.
137 KNOPH, supra note 16, at 355.
138 See I SCHLESINGER, supra note I, at 733.
13' ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 48, 230.
140 Avtl., supra note 6, § 1 reads: "The rules in this chapter shall govern, unless other
rules are provided for by the acts of the parties, or usages of trade or other custom."
213
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limited. 141 Although falling outside the scope of the definition of the
Report, a far more important right of revocation is found in section 7
of the Contract Code. 142
Further, it is tempting to speak of sections 7 and 39 in one
breath when discussing revocation in Norway, the latter provision
being treated almost like a postscript to the former. 143 This state of
affairs must be kept in mind when discussing revocable and irrevoca-
ble offers.
Finally, it should be mentioned that in Norway, as elsewhere, an
offer may generally be freely withdrawn prior to its coming to the
knowledge of the offeree. Where an offeree is hard-of-hearing, the
offeror may withdraw his oral offer if the offeree does not understand
him. An offeror is also permitted to void his written offers by stop-
ping them in transit. 144
II. Revocation of Offers
A. Offers Expressly Made Revocable
Norwegian contract law provides that offers normally are revo-
cable right up to the time that they come to the knowledge of the
offeree. Once again, actual notice is required. 145 After that, they are
normally irrevocable. These rules, however, are only declaratory,
and yield to the clear intent of the parties. 14 6 Thus, where the of-
feror inserts a clause plainly reserving the right to revoke the offer at
any time up to its acceptance, the courts will give effect to such a
provision. The significance of such a reservation may not always be
clear, but courts may interpret it to mean the so-called offer is not an
offer at all but only an invitation to deal, thereby bringing it within
the ambit of section 9.147
B. Offers Expressly Stated to be Irrevocable
Importantly, Contract Code section 1 limits the rules of the
Code to only a declaratory effect. Thus, if the offeror provides that
the offer must be accepted by a certain time, Norwegian courts hold
the offer to be irrevocable from its effective date until that final
deadline. 14 8
141 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g., ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 49-53.
144 Id. at 48. But see supra note 107.
145 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
148 See ARNIOLM, supra note 56, at 58-60. Note that Norwegian case law appears to
have provided some rather specific guidelines for interpreting language frequently used in
setting out such guidelines. It would appear that these rules allow courts to pinpoint
things precisely.
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C. Silence as to Revocability
Absent explicit provision to the contrary, an offeror is bound by
his offer. Therefore, silence as to revocability will generally mean
that offers are irrevocable once effective. An offeror may then as a
rule only escape his obligation when the offer expires, 149 or is re-
jected.15 0 Where the offer is silent as to the deadline for acceptance,
section 3 of the Contract Code sets forth a number of declaratory
rules. An oral offer has to be accepted immediately (straks).15 Writ-
ten offers will bind the offeror for as long a time as he would expect
it to take for an offer and an acceptance to reach its addressee, plus a
reasonable amount of time for the offeree to think things over. 152 If
the offer was made by telegram, the acceptance will be required to
be by telegram or some speedy equivalent. This shortens the statu-
torily-imposed deadline.' 5 3 The rule is intended to be extremely-
flexible regarding the time afforded the offeree for reflection. 154
The deadline may well be rather short for routine business agree-
ments, but longer for other less run-of-the-mill affairs.15 5
D. Options
Options are available in Norwegian law, although it appears that
no codification contains any special rules regarding them. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, a dearth of authority exists on the subject. Offers,
even those whose only content is a promise to keep another offer
open, are irrevocable once they come to the knowledge of the of-
feree. The Norwegian term isforkontrakter, literally, "pre-contracts".
Aforkontrakt arises from the acceptance of an offer to bind oneself to
further development of a legal relationship. Forkontrakter appear to
have once had a special relevance to the sale of real property in Nor-
way. Because of the introduction of recording statutes, however,
their use is now waning. 156 Apparently, a simple offer with an ex-
tended deadline for acceptance accomplishes in Norway what option
contracts do in the United States.' 57
Finally, note should be made of the Norwegian term opsjons kon-
trakter, which should not be confused with the term "option con-
tracts." Opsjons kontrakter are contracts intended to secure for one
149 See Avitl., supra note 6, § 2.
150 See id., §§ 5, 6.
151 See id., § 3.4.
152 See id., §§ 3.1, 3.2.
153 See id., § 3.3.
154 See, e.g., Rt. 1912 at 1051, where the Supreme Court found a period of over a
month for reflection not too long. The case involved a proposal sent to a close relative
offering a settlement and requesting as answer "as soon as possibly so things won't be too
delayed since they'll soon go to the Supreme Court."
155 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 59.
156 Id. at 77-78.
157 See note 148 and accompanying text. Note that Norway requires no consideration.
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party the right to enter into the contracts he desires. An example
from Norwegian case law: A agrees with B to temporarily assume
operation of B's iron mines, with a right reserved in A to assume
complete control if mining proves to be commercially practicable. 15R
A-il. Is Communication of Revocation Necessary?
I. Revocation. Distinction Between Offers to Specified Persons and
to the General Public
As in the Report, it is appropriate to distinguish between offers
made to a specific person and offers made to the public at large.
II. Importance of the Problem
Because it can only rarely arise, the question of whether revoca-
tion must be communicated seems to be of rather minimal impor-
tance in Norwegian law. Generally, offers are irrevocable once the
offeree has received actual notice of them. Before that time, an offer
may be freely withdrawn as long as the offeror complies with Con-
tracts Code section 7.159 Once an offer has become irrevocable,
however, an offeror can do little more on his own. Where special
circumstances are present, Norwegian law does grant discretion to
the court to decide whether an offeror may escape his obligation. 160
Although the offeror may petition the courts for such relief, once the
offeree has actual notice of the offer the offeror has no legal right to
effect a unilateral revocation.
III, Revocation of Offers Made to Specified Persons
It follows from the above that the discussion under this heading
must be limited to the rare case in Norway of a true offer 16 1 that is
not irrevocable, for example where the offeror explicitly provides
that the offer is revocable until acceptance.
A. Declared Revocation
No clear authority is available on the issue of declared revoca-
tion, perhaps due to the largely academic nature of the question.
Nevertheless, a solution may lie in an analogy to the withdrawal of
offers under section 7.162 The situations are in fact almost identical.
The offeror here has merely made express provision that his offer
will remain revocable past the time section 7 would otherwise have
made it irrevocable. Section 7 requires communication of the of-
158 See Rt. 1924 at 913.
I5;) See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
o See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
16 Compare "invitation to deal," discussed supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 125-26, 128, 159 and accompanying text.
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feror's intent to no longer be bound by his offer. 163 It seems clear,
absent contrary provisions in the offer itself,164 that courts will hold
the offeror to the same standard, where he or she provided that revo-
cation may come later than the section 7 cutoff.
This solution may at first appear superficial. An examination of
the Norwegian concept underlying the analogy, however, demon-
strates its accuracy. This concept is pdbud,165 unilateral declarations
binding on the addressee upon receipt. The Norwegian Contract
Code recognizes two situations that involve a pdbud. First, where an
offeree receives an offer he gains the right to accept it. He may exer-
cise this right by notifying the offeree of his acceptance. This notice
is considered to be apdbud; it binds its addressee on receipt. 166 Sec-
ond, a pdbud is involved where the offeror seeks to withdraw an offer,
as per section 7. Here, too, the power is with the declarer to bind the
addressee upon receipt of notification. A revocation of an offer
made expressly revocable will be considered a pdbud. The intent is to
effect a change in the status of the offeree without the offeree having
any further say in the matter. Although the exact time that pdbud
takes effect may vary, 167 receipt by the addressee is a minimum re-
quirement. Communication of a revocation, as defined by the Re-
port, is necessary in Norwegian law.
B. Undeclared Revocations
Norwegian law appears to provide no definitive rules regarding
undeclared revocations. What guidelines have been set up tend to
apply rather generally to all types of legal aids heretofore dis-
cussed-I-!fter/tilbud (promise/offer); pdbud (order);168 reklamasjon
(objection). 169
1. Unauthorized Revocation
Although arguably unauthorized revocation may not truly be
called an undeclared revocation, the subject is discussed here for the
sake of convenience. Norwegian courts will generally give effect to a
legal act only if the communication was authorized.' 70 Arnholm es-
163 As discussed infra at notes 178-82, whether a withdrawal is effective depends upon
when the offeree receives it.
164 Of course, if he wishes to do so, it is clear that the offeror can explicitly provide
that he need not communicate his revocation. Possibly, however, courts would consider
this a mere invitation to deal. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
165 For the legal definition ofpdbud, see supra note I11.
|66 This rule is found in Avtl., supra note 6, § 2: "Where he who has made an offer to
enter into a contract has requested a reply within a given time, the reply accepting the
offer must have been received by him (kommet frem) before the deadline has passed."
167 See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
I"68 See supra note I IL
i9 See supra note 109.
170 Arnholm provides the following example: If A gets word of the contents of a letter
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pouses this view, and notes that many close cases arise. 17 1
2. Unclear Revocation (Revocation by Conduct)
Arnholm is particularly troubled by the situation of a pdbud. If
the recipient is to be held bound by a pdbud upon receipt of any kind
of inkling as to its contents, the recipient incurs a considerable risk.
In the case of a revocation, a pdbud operates to deny the offeree the
right to accept. This right may be of considerable commercial value.
It does not therefore seem reasonable for the law to foist upon the
offeree, where a revocation may or may not be intended, the burden
of deciding this issue individually. Arnholm suggests that in such a
case the offeree has a right to ignore an unclear revocation. Never-
theless, the safest course would probably be for the offeror to object
via reklamasjon. 172
IV. Revocation of "Offers" Made to the Public
Arnholm states that revocation of offers made to the public is
best done by publication. In doing so he draws an analogy to the
situation covered by Contract Code section 14 regarding the recall of
a power of agency.17 3
A-12. When Does Revocation Become Effective?
L General Rules
The practical significance of when a revocation becomes effec-
tive in Norwegian law is rather limited. 174 One will rarely encounter
genuine offers in Norway that are nevertheless revocable. Normally,
once an offeree has actual notice of an offer, the offer will be irrevo-
cable either for the period of time provided for in the offer, or absent
this, for a reasonable period of time as determined by Contract Code
section 3.175 Where the offeror provides that the offer shall have no
binding force, courts will tend to find only an invitation to deal. 176
Nevertheless, it is clearly possible for the offeror to create a true of-
fer that remains revocable.1 77
through a third party C, communication is too remote (to be enforceable), even ifC in fact
has related the contents of the letter quite correctly. It is always risky for A to rely upon
this sort of message, as he has the simple means at his disposal of letting B know what has
happened and finding out if everything is as it should be. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 230.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 26.
17'3 See snpra note 102 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
176 See supta note 60 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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II. Time of Withdrawal or Revocation
A. Irrevocable Offers
Norwegian law is quite clear: Contract Code section 7178 pro-
vides that an offer is revoked on receipt of a notice of withdrawal,
provided that notice reaches the offeree before or at the same time as
he receives actual notice of the offer.
B. Revocable Offers
No clear statement of the Norwegian law regarding time of revo-
cation of revocable offers can be formulated, perhaps because of the
academic nature of the question. Interestingly, however, a solution
may emerge from the Norwegian concept of pdbud. As noted above,
Norwegian courts would consider a declaration intended to revoke a
revocable offer to be a pdbud.
Arnholm discusses the concept of pdbud at some length. 179 He
points out that pdbud are not something that can be thrown around to
anyone, anytime. If a pdbud is to bind someone, it must be based on
some sort of preexisting authority, a pdbudsgrunn. The above discus-
sion cited acceptances and withdrawals of offers as examples of
pdbud. The offer is the pdbudsgrunn of an acceptance. The offer is
also the pdbudsgrunn of a withdrawal. Arnholm suggests that the rea-
son that the law provides that these pdbud are binding upon receipt is
because a reasonable interpretation of the pdbudsgrunn indicates that
this is the just result.1 80
If one required that an acceptance come to the actual notice of
the offeror to be effective, it would be too easy for him or her to
evade an acceptance of an offer he or she had come to regret. Apply-
ing this same concept to the withdrawal of an offer, an offeree might
experience a slight disappointment by rejoicing over an offer, not
realizing a withdrawal is already in his or her mailbox. The offeree,
however, often suffers no real loss from this event. In any event,
offerors should be aware that they cannot expect to act instantane-
ously on offers; they need only do a little checking first. They may
then act with confidence.
Arnholm contends that situations other than those involving a
pdbud should be analyzed on the basis of the pdbudsgrunn, in search of
a rule that is reasonable. He feels that receipt should be sufficient
where an ongoing relationship is to be terminated, for example, a
notice of termination of employment. Nevertheless, a higher stan-
dard is sometimes appropriate' 8 1-perhaps receipt at a place and in
178 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
179 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 80-83.
180) Id.
181 Arnholm cites the example of a bank in charge of administering A's securities,
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a manner that the addressee ought to know of at the decisive point in
time.
It seems highly likely that Norwegian courts view an effort by an
offeror to revoke an offer expressly made revocable to be a pdbud. It
is clear, however, that such an action does not fit completely into the
already formulated rules of Norwegian contract law. Thus, it seems
probable that courts will do as Arnholm suggests, that is, evaluate
the authority behind the pdbud and seek a just solution. The analogy
to the offer-withdrawal situation is readily apparent. The argument
is even stronger there that the offeree, who has received an offer ex-
pressly revocable, must be on notice to not act without first checking
his or her mailbox. Norwegian courts would likely hold receipt of
the revocation to be sufficient to cancel the offer.
Finally, it is significant that an acceptance is also considered to
be a pdbud in Norway. Section 2 of the Contract Code' 82 provides
that an acceptance, as pdbud, is binding upon receipt. Thus, where
an offeror has reserved a right to revoke an offer at any time prior to
acceptance, he is well-advised to check his own mailbox before at-
tempting to impose a duty on the offeree of checking his.
A-13. Termination of Offer by Death or Insanity
Courts determine the ability of the offeror to contract by looking
at conditions as they were at the time of dispatch of the offer. The
fact that the offeror later becomes incompetent to contract usually is
of no consequence. Arnholm notes, however, that the line-drawing
that is done here is actually more flexible in practice. 183
In case of the death of the offeror, an analogy is made to Con-
tract Code section 21. This section governs the effects of the death
of the principal in any agency relationship. Section 21 provides that
even on the death of the principal, the power of agency will continue
to reside in the agent, unless special circumstances indicate that it
should be terminated. 184 It may fairly be inferred from this language
that a contract involving a personal element would fall within the
ambit of the special circumstance that would terminate the power of
the agent. The same rule should no doubt apply to contracts not
involving an agent.
In the case of subsequent insanity of the offeror, section 31 pro-
vides some guidance. An offeror will not be held bound if another
can be said to have exploited the offeror's lack of mental where-
withal. This rule also applies where a third party accomplished such
where A orders the bank to sell a certain block at one-the bank should be afforded a
reasonable time to acquaint itself with the order. Id. at 81.
182 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
183 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 189.
184 Avtl., supra note 6, § 21.
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exploitation and the offeree knew or should have known of this state
of affairs.' 8 5 This rule goes more to the question of the validity of
the total agreement, and does not really contradict the general rule
that offers are binding if the offeror was competent at the time of
dispatch.
B. Acceptance
B-1. Who May Accept an Offer-Assignability of Offers
I. General Observations
The assignability of offers is a consequence of the promise prin-
ciple. 186 The extent to which they bind the offeror varies. 187 By vir-
tue of the offer, the offeree acquires a legally enforceable right, a
fordring, that allows him to create a contract by accepting the of-
fer. 188 The scope of this right varies. Once the offeree has knowl-
edge of the offer, the right is absolute.' 89 Before that time, the right
remains subject to the condition that a revocation not reach the of-
feree before the offeree knows of the offer.' 90 The effect of the right
does not vary. From this principle flow a number of legal conse-
quences, the central one being the free assignability of afordring.
Early in Norwegian history the legal right embodied in afordring
was generally not assignable.' 9 ' This was due in part to the barbaric
means of enforcement that the law afforded a creditor. 192 The law
authorized one owed an outstanding obligation to make the debtor
his bondman. Moreover, it allowed the creditor to "Hugge av ham
hvor han vil, oventil eller nedentil," (cut off him as he [the creditor]
will, up high or down low) if the debtor declined to perform any
required tasks.' 93 Under these circumstances, the debtor no doubt
cared very much who became his creditor. 194
185 Id. § 31.
186 See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text. As far as revocable offers are con-
cerned, the problem of assignability has little significance because such offers will most
often be treated as mere invitations to deal, oppfordring til a gfre filbud. See supra notes 54-
73 and accompanying text. See supra notes 51-53 for definition and discussion offordring.
188 See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
181 See id. This right follows from the promise principle and is akin to that of an of-
feree in Anglo-American law once he has concluded an option contract or where the offer
is made under seal, I CORBIN, supra note 33, § 48, or is made irrevocable by statute. Id.
§ 46.
190 See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text. This right also follows from the
promise principle and is somewhat akin to the right arising from an offer made under seal
at Anglo-American law. I CORBIN, supra note 33, § 48.
191 AUGDAHL, supra note 53, at 311. Norwegian law consistent with the promise princi-
ple recognizes an enforceable right on the part of the offeree, even in the absence of an
executory contract involving mutuality of obligation. Where the offeree does not yet have
actual notice, his right will be conditional but vested nevertheless. Id. at 311.
1'9 Id. at 308.
1"13 Id. at 309.
'94 Gulatingloven, Chapter 15. Gulatingloven was the Code that governed the Gulating
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Today, however, all fordringer are presumed to be assignable.
Statutory exceptions modify this rule where the identity of the credi-
tor is crucial to the contract.' 95 In many such situations the assent of
the party owing the duty is required. 96 Norwegian law also regu-
lates assignment by offerees in certain specific factual settings where
the identity of the parties seems unimportant. 197
II. Assignability by Assent
In many situations where the personal nature of the contract or
a statutory provision prohibits assignment without assent, the parties
may effect an assignment through express agreement.' 9 In some
circumstances, parties must seek permission of the courts or some
governmental agency. 199
III. Nonassignability by Agreement
An offeror may expressly provide in the offer that the offer is not
assignable, and courts will enforce these provisions. 200 The law is
unsettled with regard to the effect of such a provision, however, on a
subsequent purchaser in good faith. 20 1
B-2. Qualified or Unqualified Acceptance?
L General Rule
For an acceptance to create a contract, it must unconditionally
comply with the offer.20 2 Norwegian law views faulty acceptance as
rejection and counteroffer. 20 3 Norwegian law requires complete
compliance with both: (1) the terms of the contract to be con-
(legal district) in Norway in the Middle Ages. Such districts existed each with a Code.
Gulating was the area of West Norway, south of Trondhjem and east of the Hardanger
plateau. The Code was already in existence in the days of Harald Harfagre (Harald the
Fair-Haired), and was the basis for the earliest legal formulations in Iceland. Gulatingloven
is still in existence. See GULBRANSEN, supra note 53, at 89.
195 AUGDAHL, supra note 53, at 309.
196 AUGDAHL states that this is the case with regard to labor contracts (exception for
the sale of one's workplace-no assent of the employees required), and rental contracts.
Id.
197 See, e.g., Lov, 14 August 1918 § 12 (bars assignment of future wages and other
forms of compensation); Lov 13 Juni 1969 (bars assignment of wrongful death or personal
injury claims).
198 See AUGDAHL, supra note 53, at 309-11.
199 See, e.g., Lov om valutaregulering av 14Juli 1950 (Law of Foreign Exchanges), reviewed
by AUGDAHL, supra note 53, at 311.
200 AUGDAnL, supra note 53, at 312.
"201 Id.
202 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 65.
203 Lov 1918 31 mai om avslutning av avtaler, om fuldmagt og om ugyldige viljeser-
kl~eringer, (No. 4) §§ 4.1, 6.1 (hereinafter Avtl.); cf. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 65; Rt.
1956 at 224 (held no contract was formed where offeree added conditions to his accept-
ance that did not accord with the offer, and offeror rejected them).
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cluded,20 4 and (2) any wording or specific form of acceptance re-
quested by the offeror. 20 5 The Norwegian Contract Code codifies
this rule: "If the response to an offer purports to be an acceptance,
but does not accord with the offer, it is viewed as a rejection ....
II. Valid Acceptance Despite Seeming Variance
Norwegian law is in accord with Schlesinger's General Report
that seeming variances between offer and acceptance will not prevent
the conclusion of the contract. 20 7
A. Differences in Wording
Unless the offeror specifies otherwise, there is no general re-
quirement that the wording of the acceptance mirror that of the of-
fer. The law requires only that the acceptance accord with (stemme
med) the offer. 208
In exceptional circumstances, an offeror may properly reject an
acceptance because its form is improper.20 9 There is no rule that an
acceptance improper in form is invalid. If the offeror voices no ob-
jection to the acceptance, the offeree is bound by its terms. 210 The
difference in wording may, however, vary the meaning between that
of the offer and the acceptance. Under certain circumstances, even
an acceptance with a variance may conclude a contract. 2 1'
B. Inclusion of Terms Implied in Fact
The offeree is generally permitted in his acceptance to include
terms that a court could conclude were factually implied in the origi-
nal offer. The inclusion of such terms will not be a bar to the forma-
tion of the contract.212 Where the offeree errs and includes terms
not factually implied, his acceptance may yet create a contract under
Norwegian law.2 13
C. Inclusion of Terms Implied at Law
Norwegian law generally also permits an offeree to include
terms in the acceptance that a court considers implied at law by the
offer. The inclusion of these terms also does not stand in the way of
204 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 65.
205 Id. at 66; see also infra notes 340-64.
206 AvtIl., supra note 6, § 6.1.
207 See I SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 125.
208 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 64; cf. Avtl., supra note 6, § 6.1.
209 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 66. Arnholm illustrates this point with the example of
negotiations seeking to come up with an amicable compromise or settlement.
2o10 Id. at 66. This seems to follow from Avtl. § 6.2.
211 See infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
212 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 65.
213 See infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
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the contract. 21 4 Some limits, however, are appropriate in this area.
An offeree must stop short of including the entire Contracts Code in
the acceptance. The offeror should be able to insist on a concise
acceptance, thus guarding against becoming encumbered with condi-
tions he or she is not bound to accept. Where the offeror receives a
verbose acceptance just prior to the deadline set in the offer, the of-
feree must be given sufficient time to submit a new and satisfactory
declaration of acceptance.2 1 5
Where an offeree errs and includes terms not implied at law in
the original offer, Norwegian law again provides that the acceptance
may effect a contract.216
Some dispute exists as to whether Norwegians actually distin-
guish terms implied at law from those implied in fact. 217 The result
is apparently the same with the inclusion of either type. Any further
distinction arises from the Norwegian law of contract interpretation,
a topic beyond the scope of this Article.
III. Additions That Do Not Make the Acceptance Ineffective: The
Borderline Between Unqualified and Qualified Acceptance
As discussed above, Norwegian law recognizes an acceptance as
unconditional if the offeree accepts without any qualifications. 21 8
This is true even where the offeree makes certain additions to the
acceptance, so long as they are not understood to qualify the of-
feree's assent. Norwegian courts tend to analyze each case on its
own merits in drawing the line here, 219 within the following parame-
ters: (1) an unconditional acceptance does not lose its validity simply
because the offeree grumbles about the bargain, 220 (2) an acceptance
is generally effective even though the offeree adds to it some re-
quests or wishes, 221 (3) an acceptance is valid where the offeree adds
to it a proposal that, if the offeror accepts it, will constitute a separate
contract. The actions of the offeree must not, however, be such as to
lead the offeror to believe the original offer was rejected.222
Difficult questions of construction arise in Scandinavian law
where the offeree sends the offeror a telegraphic acceptance with the
214 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 65.
215 Id. at 66.
216 See infra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
217 Compare KNOPH, supra note 16, at 305-06, 437-67, with ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15,
at 38-40.
218 AvItl., supra note 6, § 6.1.
219 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 72-73.
2201 See, e.g., Rt. 1951 at 376 (contract upheld when protest against price increase ac-
companied an acceptance in a supply contract situation).
221 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 69; see also RI. 1928 at 716. Arnholm notes that Danish
law differs somewhat from Norwegian law in this regard and cites to H. USSING, AFTALER
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words "I accept, details by letter." (Aksepert; naermere pr. brev.) 2 23 If
the letter arrives before the deadline for acceptance, it will appear
from the letter whether the acceptance is unconditional and the di-
lemma is skirted. If the letter is delayed, however, the offeror is left
to wonder whether the acceptance is unconditional or conditional.
The offeree should not be allowed, on his or her own volition, to
impose such uncertainty on the offeror. Scandinavian courts and
commentators have proposed possible solutions. The first is to view
the telegram as an unconditional acceptance that the offeror cannot
reject. The offeree would thus be barred from including any vari-
ance of the terms of the offer in the letter.224 The second is to ig-
nore the preliminary telegraphic acceptance altogether. 225 Arnholm
suggests a third possibility, that of selecting the solution according
to the type of contract involved. He contrasts a contract involving
the sale of marketable stocks and bonds from a contract for the sale
of real property. The highly volatile nature of stocks and bonds
would make it unreasonable to allow the offeree to refer the offeror
to a subsequent letter for details. With a land sale contract, however,
one could reasonably be expected to wait for the letter as necessary
amplification of a terse initial agreement. 226
Arnholm also distinguishes a telegraphic acceptance reading "I
accept, letter follows." (Aksepterer. Brevf'lger.) This message refers
only to the confirmation commonly exchanged in business where
contracts are entered into by wire. No indication of any further con-
ditions appears. It would be unreasonable to interpret this accept-
ance as conditional, thereby depriving the offeree of the right to
conclude the contract. The two telegraphic responses, on their
faces, have little to distinguish them. 22 7
Another problem area pertaining to the unconditionality of an
acceptance is that of vague or ambiguous language. 228 Arnholm
suggests the offeror has a right to demand that the offeree clarify his
223 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 75. This problem is discussed at some length here.
224 The offeree would still be allowed to include in his letter, among other things, the
amplifications of terms and changes in wording that courts normally recognize as
permissible.
225 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 75; see also T. ALMEN & R. EKLUND, LAGEN OM AVTAL
OCH ANDRA RXT-rSHANDLINGAR PA FORMOGENHETSRX-rENS OMRADE 8, 30 (Nordstrom ed.
1963) (Treatise on Swedish Law of Contracts) [hereinafter ALMEN & EKLUND].
226 See USSING, supra note 221, at 67, 107; contra ALMEN & EKLUND, supra note 225, at
30.
227 ARNHOLM P1I, supra note 15, at 75. The formalism of this approach seems odd in
light of the case by case determination by Norwegian courts of whether an acceptance is
unconditional. Arnholm cites no cases in support of his suggested distinction, perhaps
because he addresses a theoretical rather than a practical problem. Id. German courts
evidently treat telegrams stating "I accept, letter follows" the same. German courts look
at the course of previous negotiations and the commercial usage existing in a particular
branch of trade in construing all such declarations. See 2 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 980.
228 See ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 75. Arnholm also cites no cases applying this
distinction in his updated text. See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 66.
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or her intent, allowing the offeree a reasonable time to do so. This
reasonable time is required at least in those cases where the of-
feree's actions are not exceptionally deserving of rebuke (utpreget
klanderverdig), even if the clarification arrives after the expiration of
the original deadline for acceptance. 229 Arnholm concludes that the
offeree must, however, clarify matters upon becoming aware of the
situation.2 30
B-3. Rejection and Return Offers
I. Legal Nature of Rejection: Counter Offer and Return Offer
Distinguished
A. General Rule as to Rejection
Norwegian law permits an offeree to terminate the right of ac-
ceptance by rejecting the offer. Article 5 of the Norwegian Contract
Code codifies the rule: "Blir tilbudet avslaat, ophorer det at vaere
bindende for tilbyderen ..... " (If the offer is rejected, it ceases to be
binding on the offeror.) 231
Rejection is not possible in those circumstances where freedom
of contract is restricted by law, 23 2 specifically those involving the
kontraheringsplikt (duty to contract). This duty is applicable, for exam-
ple, to state monopolies functioning as public utilities in Norway. 233
Apart from these exceptional cases, the offeree has broad power to
reject the offer. This power to reject may in fact rise to the level of a
duty. Where an offeree originally solicits an offer and then does not
wish to enter into a contract, Norwegian law requires notice to the
offeror in certain circumstances. 234
In Norway, a rejection stands as a declaration of intention that
the offeree must communicate to the offeror, and as such amounts to
a unilateral act.2 35 Norwegians call this type of action by a party a
pcbud.236 Special rules govern such declarations.2 37 Norwegian law
requires that a rejection be a definitive expression of unwillingness
to accept, communicated within the time of the offer's validity. 238 If
the rejection is to have its desired effect, that is, termination of the
229 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 75. See infra notes 394-417 and accompanying
text regarding time limits for acceptance.
230 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 76. Arnholm cites no case in support of the solu-
tion he offers to this problem.
231 Avitl., supra note 6, § 5. The use of "bindende" is troubling to translate here. That
the offer ceases to be binding might suggest a revocable offer, not a terminated offer.
232 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 77.
233 Id. at 76-80.
234 AvtL., supra note 6, § 9.2.
235 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 80.
236 Id. at 80-83. See supra note 111 for a definition of pdbud; see supra notes 165-72
and accompanying text for a discussion of pdbud.
237 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 80-83.
238 Id. at 78.
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offer, it must fulfill the requirements of a valid legal act (disposi-
sjon). 239 For pdbud, the burden is on the offeree to make his or her
intent clear 240 if the rejection is to be a bar to later acceptance. 24 1
What constitutes a rejection is a question of interpretation and con-
struction in each case. 24 2
B. Counter Offers-Return Offers
Rejection may also take the form of a counter-offer, if the of-
feree's declaration of acceptance contains qualifications or altera-
tions inconsistent with the terms of the offer. 243 The offeree may
open up negotiations and make suggestions without necessarily re-
jecting the offer, intending to fall back on that offer while attempting
to secure better terms. Where the offeree expresses a desire to ne-
gotiate on the condition that the right to accept the original offer is
retained, courts do not deny the offeree that option.2 44 The same
rule applies even without express provision where the offeree's ac-
tions do not suggest rejection to the offeror.245
The following case indicates how far a Norwegian court may go
in this regard. Three guarantors, who already had promised to an-
swer for the part of a man's debt to a bank, were asked to execute a
new document because the man's debt had exceeded the amount of
the previous guaranty. The guarantors submitted a signed docu-
ment for an amount less than that suggested by the bank. The bank
told the debtor that this document was "worthless" and asked him to
procure a document "in a form that was usable (anvendelig)." The
bank retained the signed document, however, and it was eventually
entered onto the bank's guaranty ledger. The bank did not tell the
guarantors personally of its dissatisfaction and it did not appear that
the guarantors ever tried to get the document back. Based on these
facts, the Norwegian Supreme Court majority (6 to 1) found that the
bank could collect on the guaranty.2 46
Norwegian law also allows the offeree to make wholly independ-
ent return offers without rejecting the original offer. 24 7
23) Id. at 79.
240 Id. at 26.
241 Id. at 79. Arnholm notes that this can of course cause uncertainty for the offeror.
But the situation is not any worse and perhaps is better than that of the offeree who relies
upon an offer later proven to be flawed. Usually, the deadline for acceptance will run
before the offeree manages to dispatch an acceptance subsequent to the faulty rejection.
242 See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
243 Avtl., supra note 6, § 6.2. See supra notes 202-30 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the distinction between unconditional and conditional acceptances.
244 ARNHOLM P1I, supra note 15, at 79.
245 See, e.g., Rt. 1928 at 716.
246 See Rt. 1925 at 814.
247 But see supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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II. The Legal Effect of Rejection
The Norwegian Contract Code makes clear that rejection termi-
nates the power to accept, even if the period of time fixed for accept-
ance has not elapsed.2 48 Current Norwegian law allows the offeror
to keep the offer open even following a rejection by making a new
offer with the same terms. 249 The offeror/purchaser need not renew
an offer in a land sale contract where such party is to assume a mort-
gage and is initially rejected by the mortgagor. 250
III. Time When Rejection Becomes Effective
A rejection is a pdbud in that it is a declaration of intention that
the law requires be addressed and communicated to another per-
son.251 Generally, pdbud are effective as soon as they reach their in-
tended address, no matter when the addressee takes actual notice of
them. Article 5 is silent on when a rejection is effective. None of the
special factors that Arnholm concludes may cause a variance in the
time when a pdbud takes effect apply. 252 One can safely conclude,
therefore, that the pdbud rule is applicable to rejections as well as
acceptances. 253
B-4. Acceptance or Acknowledgement of Receipt of Offer
The problem of whether an offeree's response constitutes an ac-
ceptance or merely an acknowledgement of receipt of an offer arises
at two different points in time: (1) in the course of the parties' deal-
ings, or (2) if the parties overlook the issue, in a subsequent suit to
establish the rights of the parties.
An acceptance is a pdbud.254 An addressee who receives any
pdbud and has a reasonable doubt as to its validity or scope should
have a right to reject it rather than risk reliance on a subjective inter-
248 SeeAvtl., supra note 6, § 5, ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 78. The statute is actu-
ally somewhat sloppily worded, saying "If the offer is rejected, it ceases to be binding on the
offeror, even if the time limit for acceptance has not yet expired" (emphasis added).
Again, the use of the term bindende (binding) is troubling in that it might lead one to be-
lieve that a rejection does not terminate the offer, but merely makes it revocable until the
time for acceptance has run. Fortunately, the clarity of the second clause cleans up the
uncertainty of the first. Time remaining on the acceptance clock is simply irrelevant once
the offeree rejects the offer.
249 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 70.
250 Id. at 70.
251 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
252 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 80-83.
253 See infra notes 365-88 and accompanying text for discussion of when acceptances
are effective. See also ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 93. Where one buys an item on trial,
Kj6psl § 10 requires notice to the seller if one does not wish to keep the item. Arnholm
says that this notification amounts to a rejection of an offer and as such must be received
by the offeror to achieve its desired effect. Id.
254 ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 12. See supra notes 165-67.
[VOL. 12228
1987] FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: THE LAW IN NORWAY
pretation of the offeree's intent.2 55 In rejecting the pdbud, however,
the addressee/offeror also incurs a duty to respond (reklamas-
jonsplikt). Without response and perhaps clarification from the ad-
dressor/offeree, the offeror should be set free, even if the original
pdbud is subsequently found to be proper.2 56 Thus, an offeror who
receives what may or may not be an acceptance should seek clarifica-
tion from the offeree at once.
At trial, the issue is probably one of interpretation. Norwegian
law treats the determination of whether the offeree's response is an
acceptance or merely acknowledgement of receipt as an issue of fact
within the trial court's discretion. The trial court judge uses an ob-
jective approach, 257 looking to the language of the communication,
any prior negotiations or agreements between the parties, the cus-
toms of the trade if appropriate, and the parties' subsequent behav-
ior. The judge seeks a reasonable result. Where doubt exists, the
communication will be interpreted against its author.2 58
The problem posed in this section is analogous to the problem
of whether an acceptance by telegram containing the words "details
by letter" or "letter follows" should be regarded as conditional or
unconditional.2 59 There, as here, courts lack a clear-cut answer and
seek through detailed analysis of the facts of each case to arrive at a
just result. 260
In view of the above, parties should avail themselves of every
opportunity to clarify ambiguous communications so as to avoid the
uncertainty of submitting the matter to the courts.
B-5. Acceptance by Silence
I. General Rule
Where the offeree does nothing in response to an offer received,
Norwegian law is clear that the silence does not amount to an accept-
ance of the offer. 26 1 With silence the offeror ceases to be bound by
the offer once the deadline for acceptance has passed. 26 2 Norwegian
law recognizes a number of circumstances, however, where silence
may be deemed an acceptance. 263
255 Id. at 26.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 35-47.
2.58 Id. at 40-42.
259 Id. at 66.
260 Id.
261 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 70.
262 Id. at 70.
263 Id.
229
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II. Exceptions to the General Rule
A. Contracts for the Sole Benefit of Offeree
In Norway, promises are binding upon the promisor and a gift is
a promise.2 64 An acceptance and the giving of consideration is not
required. 265  Thus, no issue arises regarding acceptance by
silence. 266
B. Duty to Speak Arising from Law
The Norwegian Contract Code imposes a reklamasjonsplikt (duty
to speak)267 in a number of circumstances. 268 A reklamasjon is a spe-
cial kind of pdbud,269 and is a unilateral jural act by which an addres-
sor seeks to preserve a right possessed with regard to the
addressee. 270 The reklamasjonsplikt may fall upon either an offeror or
an offeree depending upon the statute and circumstances. The im-
pact of a reklamasjonsplikt is best seen in terms of the various statutes
that impose the duty.
Silence may commit an offeror to a contract where he has made
an oppfordring til d gjre tilbud (invitation to deal). 271 This invitation
amounts to a promise whose binding effect has been neutralized by
the offeror's reservation. 272 The invitor acquires the special duty to
respond to the offers generated. 273 If the invitor receives an offer
within a reasonable time and is or should be aware that it is in re-
sponse to his or her oppfordring, the invitor must communicate rejec-
tion without unreasonable delay. 274 Otherwise, article 9 of the
Contract Code provides that silence is deemed to be an
264 Id. at 13.
265 Id. at 14.
266 Arnholm points out that one should in fact scrupulously avoid all behavior that
might be construed as an acceptance of a gift. The acceptance is unnecessary. It will not
"bind" the promisor-he is already bound. It will bind the promisee, however, and this
means that he can no longer refuse the gift. This can be costly where the gift object
damages someone's property. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 76.
267 Avil., § 9. As the Schlesinger Report indicates, the use of the term "duty to speak"
is in accord with general usage although the term may not be entirely accurate. What is
actually meant is not a duty on the part of the offeree, but a loss of a power or immunity-
if the offeree does not speak, he will lose his power to reject the offer and his immunity
from a contract action. See 1 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 132. The Norwegian term is
reklamasjonsplikt. See supra note 109 for a definition and discussion of this term.
268 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 71.
269 Id. at 15.
27) Id. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text for definition and discussion of
pdbud.
271 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 57. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of invitations to deal.
272 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 57.
273 Avil., supra note 6, § 9. See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 7. Arnholm suggests that
Norwegian courts may also view such oppfordi4iiger to contain a promise to reimburse the
other party for expenses incurred in drawing up a detailed offer. Id.
274 AvIl., supra note 6, § 9. See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 7.
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acceptance. 275
Silence may also operate as an acceptance on an original offeror
who receives a late or noncomplying acceptance.2 76 Normally, this
sort of reply prevents the formation of a contract. 277 Under Norwe-
gian law, however, that acceptance has some legal effect. Articles 4.1
and 6.1 of the Norwegian Contract Code provide that it is to be
viewed as a new offer. 278 In certain situations, Norwegian law pro-
vides that the silence of the original offeror will be viewed as an ac-
ceptance of this "new offer." 2 79
Norwegian law provides that where the offeror knows or ought
to know that the offeree thinks he or she is properly accepting the
offer, the offeror must without unnecessary delay, notify the offeree
that he or she finds the acceptance wanting.280 If the original offeror
remains silent, a contract will be effected on the terms stated in the
acceptance.28' This rule is applicable even where the offeree miscal-
culates the deadline for acceptance or employs a method of dispatch
resulting in a late arrival. 282 Courts have applied the rule where the
offeree is aware that the acceptance is at variance with the offer, but
where under the conditions the offeree was justified in thinking that
the acceptance would be well-received. 283
Nothing bars an offeree from waiving the right to reklamasjon,
impliedly or expressly. 28 4
Additional statutes that render silence the equivalent of accept-
ance by imposing a reklamasjonsplikt include sections 5, 82, and 90.2
of the Code, which regulate brokers, agents and travelling sales-
men; 28 5 and section 60 of the Sales Code.28 6 The operation of these
275 Avil., supra note 6, § 9.
276 Id. at 67.
277 Id.
278 Id. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text; see infra notes 418-23 and ac-
companying text.
279 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 67.
280 AvIl., supra note 6, §§ 4.2, 6.2. See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 67.
281 Avtl., supra note 6, §§ 4.2, 6.2.
282 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 67.
283 Rt. 1938 at 259. Arnholm notes that this decision is also consistent with the poli-
cies underlying the Norwegian Contract Code. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 67.
284 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 67.
285 See Lov av 30juni 1916 No. 1 om kommission, handelsagentur og handelsreisende.
Section 5 provides that a broker must give notice without unnecessary delay if he does not
wish to accept a consignment from someone with whom he has a trade agreement. Sec-
tions 82 and 90.2 together deal with the situation where a buyer who is dealing via an
agent or travelling salesperson receives a notice from the principal that the principal con-
siders a contract to exist, or an order to have been placed. The statutes require that the
buyer notify the principal if he wants to claim that there is no binding contract or valid
order. Otherwise, his silence will bind him.
286 See Lov av 24 mai 1907 No. 2 om kj6b. Section 60 provides that where an item is
sold "on approval" the buyer is bound by the contract where after delivery he retains
possession without notifying the seller of his wish within a reasonable period or within the
period specified in the contract. Cf Rt. 1930 at 799.
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statutes is similar to the Contract Code.
Article 32 of the Contract Code imposes a reklamasjonsplikt where
a communication has been garbled through the fault of the addres-
sor, or through faulty telegraphy or human error.28 7 Here, too, si-
lence in the face of a duty to speak may be deemed an acceptance. 288
Article 40 provides that one who delivers notice to expedition by
mail or other responsible means has fulfilled his or her duty. 28 9 Ap-
parent "silence" due to the loss of or delay in notification will not be
deemed an acceptance. 290
C. Duty to Speak Arising from Prior Agreement of the Parties
Norwegian law permits parties to agree that a contract may be
concluded in the future by the silence of the offeree following an
offer. 291
D. Duty to Speak Arising from Prior Dealing or Negotiations
1. Following Established Patterns of Conduct
Norwegian law construes the offeree's silence as an acceptance
where the offeror and offeree have had prior contacts independent of
the present transaction. 292 Such construction must be reasonable in
light of the prior dealings of the parties.2 93
2. Reducing Mutual Claims to Certainty
A problem arises where the offeror proposes not an independ-
ent deal similar to a previous one, but only a reduction to certainty of
mutual claims resulting from previous dealings. 294 Norwegian law
does not except this situation from the general rule and allow silence
to operate as an acceptance.29 5 It can be assumed, therefore, that
the general rule applies and silence is not acceptance.
E. Duty to Speak in Current Negotiations
In the course of or at the end of negotiations conducted among
persons with no similar previous dealings, Norwegian law may yet
impose on the offeree a duty to speak.
287 Avtl., supra note 6, § 32. See supra text accompanying note 43; see ARNHOLM, supra
note 56, at 72.
288 AvMl., supra note 6, § 32. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 72.
281) Avtl., supra note 6, § 40.
29 Id.
291 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 71.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See 1 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 133-34.
295 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 70-75.
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1. Offer Solicited by the Offeree
Article 9 of the Norwegian Contract Code regulates the offer
solicited by the offeree.
2. Final Offer Made by a Party After Some Negotiations
Articles 4.2 and 6.2 of the Norwegian Contract Code apply to
final offers made after negotiations.
3. Letters of Confirmation29 6
Norwegian law recognizes a contract where one party receives
notification from another indicating a belief that: (1) a contract has
been concluded; and (2) it contains certain terms. 29 7 The ad-
dressee's silence in the face of such notification may be deemed ac-
ceptance.2 98 The rule applies where litigants dispute the existence
of a contract or admit its existence but disagree on its terms. 299
There is a clear policy behind this rule. Letters of confirmation are
an effort at clarity, a commodity so valuable that Norwegian laws
place the minor burden of reklamasjon on the addressee.30 0
Norwegian law also permits a letter of confirmation 3 0 ' to in-
clude clauses that do not directly follow from the parties' previous
agreement.3 0 2 Such clauses serve most often to supplement a con-
tract that is incomplete in its terms, although they may also under-
take a change that the drafter of the letter of confirmation reasonably
believes is in the interest of both parties.3 0 3 In both cases, where
appropriate, silence by the addressee may be acceptance.3 0 4
The rule is not without qualification, however. The addressee
need not respond where the other party claims that which is mani-
festly unreasonable.3 0 5 The rule does not protect the addressor who
indiscriminately sends stadfestelser to a number of persons in the hope
296 It is important to distinguish the letters discussed here from those contemplated
by AvIt., supra note 6, § 8. Section 8 provides: "Even if an offeror has declared that he will
consider the silence of the other party to be an acceptance, or it otherwise appears from
the circumstances that he is not expecting an explicit answer, the other party has a duty
upon request to reveal whether he wishes to accept the offer. If he does not do so, the
offeror is free (of his offer)." Id.
297 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 68, 72.
298 See Rt. 1902 at 247. ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 72. Arnholm cites a number of
cases in support of this rule. Id. at 73-75.
299 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 72.
300 Id.
301 The Norwegian term is stadfestelser. See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 72.
302 Id. Cf. Rt. 1930 at 799 (attempt to include "on approval" clause by buyer found to
be "significant change"-could not therefore rely on silence by seller).
303 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 72.
304 Arnholm notes that the rule also governs the issue raised by Avtl. § 32, see supra
text accompanying note 93.
305 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 72.
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that someone is so careless as to not protest. 30 6 Courts must admin-
ister the rule with considerable elasticity.3 0 7 Merchants should com-
ply strictly, but private parties dealing with one another on terms of
distinct trust should not feel similarly compelled. 30 8
F. Invoice and Other Documents Relating to Performance
Where one party sends the other an invoice or other document
relating to performance but also containing additional terms or
terms in variance with the original contract, questions of acceptance
arise. Silence may be deemed an acceptance of those terms at Nor-
wegian law under the rule concerning prior dealings.
G. Offer Stating that Silence Will Be Deemed Acceptance
Norwegian law recognizes that the offeror cannot by unilateral
declaration force the offeree to speak or enter the contract. 30 9
H. Oral Offers
No specific rule on oral offers appears in Norwegian law. Where
a person receives an oral offer, however, it is not unreasonable to
require objection if that person does not wish to conclude the con-
tract. 31 0 Most often one may interpret the actions of the offeree and
determine whether there has been an acceptance. As Arnholm puts
it, taushet kan vaere talende (silence can be telling).3i
B-6. Acceptance by Performance
I. Preliminary Remarks
A. The Problem Raised by the Schlesinger Report
The Schlesinger Report distinguishes between two categories of
offers: (1) Offers in which the offeror seeks to obtain a promise, that
is, an obligation of the offeree in exchange for his or her own prom-
ise, and (2) offers where the offeror does not seek a promise, but
rather an act or result on which his or her promise is conditional; for
example, A tells B: "Perform such an act, or achieve such a result,
and I will pay you a certain sum of money.13 1 2 In Norway, a contract
consisting of a promise and an act is called a realkontrakt.3 13 An ac-
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 See R1. 1916 at 945; ARNIIOLM, supra note 56, at 72.
309 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 70.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 See supro notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
3 GULBRANSEN, supra note 21, at 173. Norwegians do not have a common designa-
tion for bilateral contracts. Norwegians speak ofgiensidig bebvrdende (mutually obligating
contracts) but this term is meant to distinguish single-obligation contracts, e.g.. gave kon-
trac/er (gift contracts).
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ceptance by performance is referred to as an oppfylleleshandling, or a
real akt.31 4 The discussion in this section examines the manner in
which such offers can be accepted.
B. General Rule
In Norway, almost all offers, including those calling for an act,
are viewed as susceptible of acceptance by any expression of assent
on the part of the offeree. 315 The discussions of this rule by com-
mentators reviewed in the preparation of this Article imply that the
rule flows from the promise principle, 31 6 which forms the core of
Norwegian contract law. No authority can be found, however, that
explicitly traces this connection. 3 17
In Norway, the promise contained in an offer is binding and ir-
revocable as soon as the offeree has actual knowledge of the offer. 318
This is so whether the offer contemplates a response in the form of a
promise or an act.3 1 9 In either case, the promise is irrevocable until
such time as the offeree either rejects the offer or the deadline for
acceptance passes. 320
Norwegian law does distinguish between bilateral and unilateral
contracts.32' The distinction is significant, however, mainly with re-
spect to the effects of the two types of contracts; 322 the distinctions
have little effect on the creation of the obligations arising from such
contracts. 323 This is because, pursuant to the promise principle,
these obligations have their source in the irrevocability of the
promises with the individual party or parties.3 24 The Norwegian
legal system is unhampered by the intricacies of the doctrine of con-
sideration that loom so large in the Anglo-American concept of uni-
lateral contract.3 25
II. Performance as Acceptance
In Norway, an offeror may explicitly demand a formal accept-
ance. ' 26 Such a demand will be enforced by the courts, both where
314 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 63-64.
315 KNOPH, supra note 16, at 348.
:'I " See supra notes 15-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of this principle.
3117 See, e.g., ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 62-64, 85-86, 223-25; KNOPH, supra note
16, at 343-49; AUGDAHL, supra note 53, at 5.
318 See supra notes 110-11, 145 and accompanying text.
l1) See ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 63.
320 See snpra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
321 See supra note 313.
322 AUGDAHL, supra note 53, at 5.
323 See ARNHOLM PIH, supra note 15, at 62-63.
'124 See supra notes 15-50 and accompanying text.
'1 See I SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 141-42 for a general 'discussion of the civil law-
common law split in this area. See also I CORBIN, supra note 33, at 63, where an analogy is
drawn to "firm offers" that is helpful in understanding this problem.
326i ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 63; see .1hill., supra note 6, § I.
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the law normally does not require an acceptance, for example, where
a gift is intended, and where the law allows acceptance by perfor-
mance. 327 The offeror may waive formal acceptance or may be con-
tent with an acceptance by performance.3 28 Occasionally, the offeror
says this expressly. More often courts construe offers to that
effect. 3 29
The law appears settled that an acceptance by performance is
sufficient to render the promise of the offeror irrevocable.33° The
extent, however, to which the offeree's performance constitutes a
declaration of acceptance, binding the offeree to the promise implicit
in his or her performance, is an unsettled question.33 1 Arnholm's
opinion is that one should not so construe a performance. 332 He
notes some basis in practice for the distinction where parties trade at
a distance and acceptance is by performance, and where the offeror
is contractually obligated by his or her promise once performance is
had. Where the offeree sends an acceptance, however, the offeror is
contractually obligated by his promise when the acceptance ar-
rives.33 3 Arnholm further states that courts also grant the offeree a
longer period of time to perform, for example, to send the goods,
than they grant the offeree to dispatch an acceptance. 334
Finally, the provisions of article 8 of the Contract Code must be
considered. 335 This provision covers the situation involving an of-
feror's demand of "express" acceptance as well as that requiring no
acceptance.3 36 Under this rule, the offeror is allowed to formally ask
whether the offeree intends to accept the offer. 33 7 If the offeree re-
plies in the negative, or does not answer, the offeror is set free from
the offer.338 The offeror can take advantage of this rule to prevent
being bound to a contract by the performance of the offeree. 339
327 ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 63. Generally, acceptance by performance is always
allowed.
328 Id. at 63.
:329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id. The issue would arise in practice where the offeree had partially performed but
did not now wish to complete performance.
332 Id. Arnholm unfortunately does not provide any details as to who feels otherwise
about this issue.
333 Id. Terminology is problematic. The offer becomes irrevocable once the offeree has
actual knowledge. However, the offeror is legally obligated by this irrevocable promise only
when acceptance is complete (i.e. upon performance or receipt).
334 Id. This rule appears to be problematic and is subject to some exceptions.
335 See Avil., supra note 6, § 8, translated supra at note 296.
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B- 7. Is Communication of Acceptance Necessary?
I. General Principle
Norwegian law requires that, within the deadline set for accept-
ance, the acceptance must have been received by the offeror.3 40 The
offeror need not have yet received actual knowledge of the accept-
ance. 34' On the other hand, actual knowledge normally suffices if
the formal declaration of acceptance is not received within the time
limit. 34 2
II. Exceptions
A. Acceptance by Silence
Where Norwegian law requires no expression of assent at all,
the requirement of communication cannot, of course, come into
play.3 43 Technically, this is probably not an exception to the rule
requiring communication.
B. Acceptance by Performance
Unless specifically requested, acceptance by performance need
not be communicated to the offeror.344
C. Trade Practices or Other Usages
Trade practices or other usages may have decisive influence on
the necessity of communication of acceptance. 345 Arnholm cites the
example of newspaper ad placement, where no acceptance is ex-
pected other than that the ad be printed.346
D. Waiver
The Norwegian Contract Code is declaratory only. 34 7 The of-
feror has power to demand a specific form of acceptance, including
power to be content with less than the law requires. Thus, the of-
feror may waive communication of acceptance where the law would
otherwise require it.348
340 Avil., supra note 6, § 2.1. See ARNHOLM Pll, supra note 15, at 69.
:441 ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 69. Such a rule would obviously make it too easy
for the offeror to avoid learning of the acceptance.
342 Id. This particular rule is subject to certain exceptions. See id. at 289.
:443 See supra notes 264-311 and accompanying text.
'444 See supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text. This constitutes an exception of
great significance in business practice. See KNOPH, supra note 16, at 348-49.
'445 See ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 63.
" d.
1447 See A4vtl., supra note 6, § 1.
348 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 69.
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B-8. Means of Declaring and Communicating Acceptance
I. The Nature of the Problem
The means chosen by the offeree for communicating acceptance
may be improper for one or both of the reasons that such means is
(1) not timely or (2) not in compliance with requirements of form.3 49
II. Clear Stipulation in the Offer
If the offeror specifies a particular means of communicating the
acceptance, Norwegian law generally requires the offeree to comply
with this request or risk rejection of this acceptance.350 The impact
of articles 4.2 and 6.2 of the Contract Code, however, may impose a
duty to speak upon the offeror in certain circumstances.3 5 1
III. Unclear Stipulation in the Offer
Where the offeror suggests a particular means of communica-
tion without making it clear that no other means will suffice for ac-
ceptance, a question of interpretation arises. Is the offeror
interested in speed, or certainty, or both?
Norwegian law directs the offeree to look to the means of dis-
patch the offeror used for the offer, and follow this lead.3 5 2 Article 3
of the Contract Code is the source of this rule.3 53 Although the main
force of the rule is directed at deadlines for acceptance, its last two
clauses deal with the means of acceptance. 354 The next-to-last-
clause provides that where an offer is made by telegram the accept-
ance should be telegraphic unless it will arrive equally quickly in
some other way.355 The last clause provides that oral offers that do
not set a deadline must be accepted right away (straks), on the
spot.3 56 Here, again, the provisions of articles 4.2 and 6.2 of the
Contract Code may "save" an acceptance under certain
circumstances. 357
IV No Stipulation in the Offer
The same rules apply here as above. Courts look first to the
means the offeror employed to convey the offer. 3 58 Beyond that,
349 This division meshes with that used in the Schlesinger Report. See I SCHLESINGER,
supra note 1, at 151.
350 Avl., supra note 6, § 1; see ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 69, 76.
351 See AMl., supra note 6, §§ 4.2, 6.2.
352 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 68, 74-75.
353 See Avil., supra note 6, § 3; ARNHOLM PHI, supra note 15, at 68.
354 See Avt., supra note 6, § 3; ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 67-69. This section of
the Code is discussed in more detail infra at notes 407-11 and accompanying text.
355 Atl., supra note 6, § 3.
356 Id.; see ARNHOLM PI1, supra note 15, at 68, 75.
357 See Atl., supra note 6, §§ 4.2, 6.2.
358 See id. § 3; ARNHOLM PIH, supra note 15, at 68, 75.
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courts seek to achieve reasonableness, and consider commercial us-
age, practice in prior dealings between the parties, and any special
circumstances such as a fluctuating market.3 59
V. Legal Requirements of Form
In making certain types of contracts, Norwegian law mandates
adherence to specified form.A60 Where the law allows only one form,
the parties must comply or face certain consequences.3 6'
VI. Consequence of Improperly Communicated Acceptance
An improperly communicated acceptance may prevent the con-
clusion of a contract.3 62 As noted below, the rule is the same regard-
less of the type of impropriety involved. Where the offeree on
receiving the acceptance promptly indicates approval, a contract re-
sults under two theories: (1) The improperly communicated accept-
ance is regarded as a counter offer, and the original offeror may then
accept this offer; 36 3 or (2) the silence of the offeror alone may be
binding if the offeror knows or ought to know that the offeree thinks
the acceptance is properly communicated. 364
B-9. When Acceptance Becomes Effective
I. Statement of the Basic Rule
Some explanation is necessary at the outset regarding the Nor-
wegian concept of acceptance in light of the focus of this subsection.
Norwegians view acceptance as having two components. The most
important is the unilateral declaration by the offeree that the offer is
accepted. 365 This declaration is a pdbud,3 66 and as such operates to
impose a legal duty upon the offeror by establishing the contractual
relationship. 367 "[The offeror's] offer is locked firmly into a contract
[by the acceptance]. ' 368 The pdbud power of the acceptance shuts
down preliminary negotiation and simultaneously starts up the con-
tractual relationship. It is therefore the focus of the discussion that
follows.
The second component that Norwegians view as being present
35) See ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 68.
360 Examples appear infra at notes 434-42 and accompanying text.
361 ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 26. Arnholm notes, however, that it is uncertain
exactly what those "consequences" are. Id.
362 See Avil., supra note 6, §§ 1, 2, 6.
363 See id., §§ 4.1 (late acceptance), 6.1 (other impropriety in the acceptance).
364 See id. See supra notes 271-90 and accompanying text.
365 ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 85.
•3456 Id. at 91. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text for a definition and dis-
cussion of the concept of "pdbud."
367 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 85.
368 Id.
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in an acceptance is a promise (lofte). 369 The promise is that of the
offeree to undertake the performance contemplated by the offer. 370
Different rules govern these two distinct elements of an acceptance.
The rule governing when the promise contained in an accept-
ance becomes "effective" (that is irrevocable) is the same principle
that applies to offers and to all promises in Norway.37 1 The rule gov-
erning acceptance as pdbud is the following: a pdbud imposes a legal
duty on its addressee on receipt, 372 with some reservations. 373 The
"reception" theory adopted by the Norwegian legal system, as well
as by other Scandanavian, German, Swiss, and Austrian systems, 374
is perhaps a necessary outgrowth of the "promise principle." The
theory of "reception" is in distinct contrast with the Anglo-American
theory of "expedition," the so-called mailbox rule. 375 For this rea-
son, significant differences result under the two theories, in terms of
who bears the risk of loss and/or lateness at a given point in time.3 76
It should be recalled, however, that the "reception" rule is not
mandatory under Norwegian law; all rules of the Contract Code are
merely declaratory. 377 The offeror is the master of the offer and may
validly stipulate that the acceptance is deemed to be made, for exam-
ple, when the offeree dispatches the acceptance. 378
II. What Constitutes Reception?
The general guideline regarding what constitutes "reception" is
that the offeree must have submitted the acceptance to the workings
of such external forces as would allow the offeree, based on the nor-
mal course of events, to expect that the offeror could directly gain
knowledge of the acceptance, so that it becomes the offeror's respon-
sibility to see that he or she does so. 379 In essence, the "reception"
369 Id.
370 Id.
31 Id. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text for the rule on when offers be-
come irrevocable. See also supra notes 15-50 and accompanying text regarding the
"promise principle."
372 See Avil., supra note 6, § 2.1; see also ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 69, 81; KNOPH,
supra note 16, at 348.
373 The same rule applies without reservation to the pdbud that exists in the recall of a
promise. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text regarding revocation of offers.
See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 91.
374 See 2 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 1464-65.
375 Id.
3776 The full ramification of this distinction would be too far-reaching to be dealt with
adequately here. Compare 2 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 1464-65 (discussion of the recep-
tion theory) with CORBIN, supra note 33, at 78, 80, 81.
A77 vtl., supra note 6, § 1. See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 69.
378 ARNHOLM P11, supra note 15, at 69.
379 "Akseptanten maa ha bragt akcepten under slike ydre forhold, at han efter livets
amindelige regel kan regne paa at tilbyderen umiddelbart blir bekjendt med den, saaledes
at det beror paa denne selv, om dette skal bli tilfeldet eller ikke. (tkast til lov om avtaler
og andre retshandlinger paa formuerettens omr~der." (Draft of the Contract Code), at 25,
reprinted in ARNIOLM PII, supra note 15, at 70. Specific statutes govern certain types of
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theory requires the written declaration of acceptance to reach the
sphere controlled by the offeror.3 80
Contracts made by word of mouth, including telephone commu-
nication, rarely present problems. Reception generally equals actual
knowledge,38 1 with perhaps one exception. The offeror cannot
avoid contract by holding his ears.3 8 2 Moreover, an unsuspecting
offeree vocalizing acceptance need not bear the burden with an of-
feror who is stone deaf or suffering from delusions.383 If the offeree
knows of the communication problem, however, the offeree must
overcome the disability or barrier. If the offeree observes the offeror
to be dead-drunk, the offeree should leave a note somewhere where
the imbiber will find it, or repeat the message when the person is
sober again.3 84
Written acceptances raise more difficult problems. Arnholm be-
lieves that the mailing destination of the acceptance should be the
return address indicated by the offeror,38 5 or the offeror's office ad-
dress if no return address appears, and the offeror's private address
for non-commercial dealings.386 There are a number of other fact
patterns that prove troublesome in this area, far too numerous to
recount here. A partial listing of topics suggests the scope of the
problem: post office boxes, rural deliveries, registered letters, per-
manent and temporary changes of address, postage due letters, ad
nauseum. One concludes that courts will apply the above standard
and decide these cases ad hoc.38 7 Arnholm notes that courts also
require parties to show good faith and exercise common sense.3 88
III. Revocation of Acceptance
Article 7 of the Norwegian Contract Code provides that an ac-
ceptance may be revoked by the offeror's receipt of a message to this
effect either before or at the same time he or she acquires actual
knowledge of the acceptance.38 9 The reasoning behind this statute
is that the promise component of an acceptance does not become
irrevocable until the original offeror has actual knowledge of that
contracts with regard to when receipt occurs. See, e.g., Lov av 6. juni 1930 N. 20 om Forsikr-
ingavtater (Insurance Contracts Code), § 33.3. Receipt may be had on behalf of an offeree
by those whom the offeree authorizes. ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 72.
380 The statement of the rule in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland aids understand-
ing here. See 2 SCHLESINGER, supra note I, at 1467.




385 Id. at 70.
386 Id.
387 See generally id. at 70-71.
388 See ARNHOLM P1, supra note 15, at 71.
:389 See Avtl., supra note 6, § 7, translated and discussed supra at text accompanying note
125. The same statute governs both revocation of offers and acceptances.
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promise. 390 The offeree may therefore revoke this acceptance and
prevent final conclusion of the contract. 3 9 1 Once both parties are
irrevocably bound by their promises, a contract exists.3 9 2
In certain circumstances, the promise of the offeree contained in
the acceptance may become irrevocable at a time earlier than receipt.
This occurs, for example, in the sale of lottery tickets or the under-
writing of insurance. One who has sold a lottery ticket cannot legally
revoke his or her acceptance, after the ticket has been declared a
winner, nor can an insurance company recall its acceptance if a claim
on the policy has already arisen. 39 3
B-JO. Time Limit for Acceptance
The Norwegian Contract Code closely regulates the time limit
for acceptance of contracts. 394
I. Express Time Limit for Acceptance
Norwegian law allows the offeror to effectively specify a time
limit for acceptance.3 9 5 Norwegian law will give effect to an express
time limit even if it contains an ambiguous term. 39 6 Norwegian case
law provides guidance for determining the meaning of certain fre-
quently-used terms. 39 7
Where the offeror specifies a deadline for acceptance, this date
is assumed to refer to the time of receipt of the acceptance.39
8
Where an offeror states the offer shall be open for a specified period,
but does not state when the period starts, article 2.2 of the Contract
Code provides supplementary rules. 39 9 If the offer is by letter, the
period runs from the date appearing on the letter.40 0 If the letter is
undated, its postmark is determinative. 40 ' If the date is in error, the
390 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 85.
391 Avl., supra note 6, § 7; see ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 57. In spite of this rule,
the main purpose of the acceptance remains that of binding the offeror to his promise in a
contract. This will have already occurred on receipt.
392 See supra notes 15-50 and accompanying text for discussion of the promise
principle.
393 See ARNHOLM PIT, supra note 15, at 85.
394 See, e.g., Avtl., supra note 6, §§ 2, 3, 4, 32.
395 Id. § 1; see ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 67.
396 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 67.
397 See id. at 67-68. Arnholm discusses the probable effect to be given such terms as
"innen en bestemt dag" (by a certain day); "til en dag" (until a certain day); and "om-
giende svar" (answer by return mail). He also discusses special rules applicable in com-
mercial dealings. Id.
'498 See id. at 69. This follows from the "reception" theory discussed supra at notes
379-88 and accompanying text.
399 See Avl., supra note 6, § 2.2; see also ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 68.
400 Avtl., supra note 6, § 2.2.
401 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 68.
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provisions of article 32 of the Code come into play. 40 2 If the offer is
by telegram, the period runs from the instant the offeror delivers the
telegram at the station for dispatch. 403 If transmission is delayed,
the rule of article 4.2 applies, and, as discussed previously, the con-
tract may yet be concluded even where the offeree is at fault.404
Norwegian courts attempt to interpret open-ended time limits as
calling for a reasonable time for response, where possible.40 5 Article
8 of the Code is also useful to the offeror in such a case. Using this
provision, the offeror may effectively cutoff the offer by requesting
that the offeree respond.40 6
II. Implied Time Limit for Acceptance
Norway applies a "reasonableness" standard as an implied time
limit for acceptance. Article 3 of the Contract Code provides a
number of rules to guide a court in the determination of what consti-
tutes reasonableness. 40 7 A written offer "binds" the offeror- that
is, the offeree may accept the offer-for the period of time the of-
feror would expect to be required for the offer and acceptance to
reach their respective addresses. 40 8 The law adds to this a reason-
able period of "thinking it over" time for the offeree.40 9 Lawmakers
specifically chose an elastic formulation of this rule.4 10 Deadlines are
relatively short for everyday transactions among merchants, but
longer for intricate dealings that are broad in scope and future
impact.4 1
A 1912 case demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, a rea-
sonable period may be very long indeed. The suit arose among fam-
ily members. One side offered a settlement and requested a
response "as quickly as possible . . . because this case will soon be
heard in the Supreme Court." The Norwegian Supreme Court
found that a one-month delay in responding to the offer was reason-
able, because this was still well in advance of the date set for hearing
the case.4 2
402 Id. SeeAvIl., supra note 6, § 32, translated and discussed supra at text accompanying
note 93.
403 Avtl., supra note 6, § 2.2. Because Norway applies the "reception" theory, it seems
odd that the law here starts the clock running upon dispatch. This is contrary to the rule in
other states applying the "reception" theory. Cf 1 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 166.
Arnholm provides no clue as to the reason for this anomaly.
404 See supra notes 263-90 and accompanying text.
405 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 63.
406 Avil., supra note 6, § 8. This statute is discussed supra at notes 327-31 and accom-
panying text.
407 See Avtl., supra note 6, § 3; ARNHOLM PIT, supra note 15, at 68.
408 AvIl., supra note 6, § 3.
409 Id.
410 See ARNHOLM PI1, supra note 15, at 68.
411 Id.
412 See Rt. 1912 at 7051.
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Concerning the time consumed in sending the offer and accept-
ance, Norwegian courts decide by looking at the circumstances as the
offeror perceived them at the time of the dispatch. 4 13 The courts do
not lengthen the period for acceptance where the sender discovers
too late a disruption in communication that delays conveyance. 4 14
Where the offer is sent by telegraph, courts allow the offeree the
time required by a return wire. 415 A telegraphic offer also shortens
the time allowed the offeree to mull over his response-the offeree
should know enough to hurry.4 16
Article 3 requires that oral offers, including those by telephone,
must be accepted straks (more or less immediately). 417
B-11. Late Acceptance
If an acceptance arrives too late, Norwegian law creates no con-
tract.4 18 A late acceptance is deemed to be a new offer, which its
recipient may choose to accept and thereby bring about the con-
tract. 4 19 The rule is only declaratory, however.420 The author of the
acceptance may have expressly provided that no new offer may arise
if the reply arrives late.4 2' Alternatively, the facts may dictate that
the original offeree did not intend to become a party to a contract if
such contract was not concluded immediately on the arrival of the
acceptance. 422
Under limited circumstances, the late acceptance may create a
contract where the original offeror takes no action and allows the
offer arising out of the belated acceptance to lapse. Article 4.2 of the
Contract Code imposes a duty on the recipient of a late acceptance
to notify the other party if he or she knows or ought to know that the
offeree assumes all is in order.423
413 ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 68.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Arnholm notes further that although courts will view the time for acceptance as
having three components-two communications periods and one period for thinking
things over-courts still set only one deadline. If the offer arrives before expected, the
offeree may get more thinking time. If the offeree thinks too long he or she may still beat
the clock by returning a reply by means faster than the offeror expects. Conversely, if the
offer is delayed, even through fault of the offeror, the offeree's time will be shortened. If
the delay is significant, the offer may be expired before reaching the offeree. ARNHOLM
PI, supra note 15, at 68-69.
417 Avitl., supra note 6, § 3.
418 See AvIl., supra note 6, § 4.1; ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 76.
419 Avt., supra note 6, § 4.1; see ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 76.
420 AvMl., supra note 6, § 1; see ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 76.
421 ARNHOLM PIt, supra note 15, at 76.
422 Id. Arnholm cites the example of a contract for the sale of seasonal goods, a set-
ting where an inordinate degree of speculation is involved. Id.
423 See Avtl., supra note 6, § 4.2; cf id. § 6.2.
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C. Other Problems Concerning Conclusion of Contracts
C-1. Manifestation of Assent without Identifiable Sequence of Offer
and Acceptance
Norwegian law recognizes the line drawn between mere negotia-
tions and a binding contract.4 24 The considerable litigation in this
area 4 2 5 has revealed some general guidelines: (1) a court will not
find a contract where conscious dissent between the parties on one
or more terms is apparent;4 2 6 (2) a contract may exist even though
agreement is lacking on certain specifics, and the parties are aware of
the need for clarification. 4 2 7 The law may fill in what is lacking, or
the court may direct the parties to negotiate their way forward within
the bounds of reasonableness .428
Between merchants, courts more often give effect to incomplete
contracts than between private parties, friends, or relatives. 42 9
Courts enforce stricter demands where the contract involves large,
important dealings. 430 This is particularly true where parties deal in
real property, though incomplete contracts are not unknown here. 4 3'
In general, a tendency of the courts, akin to that in French law, is
to find the parties bound at contract once negotiations open. 43 2 This
is in keeping with the duty of good faith between parties that
Norwegians consider to be an essential, although unwritten, require-
ment of their contract law.4 3 3
C-2. Agreements Contemplating a Writing or Other Formality
I. Scope of this Report
During negotiations, two parties may agree that, as an additional
step on their road to contract, their transaction be reduced to a writ-
ing, or that some other formality be observed. 4 34 Where this agree-
ment is not fulfilled, doubts arise as to whether the contract is
concluded. This Article deals with these problems, but is not con-
cerned with situations in which a transaction is required by law to be
in writing or to comply with some other formality.43
5
424 ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 63.
425 See, e.g., cases cited in id. at 63-64.
426 Id. at 64.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 See id. at 64-65.
430 Id. at 65.
431 Id.
432 Id.; cf. ARNHOLM PI, supra note 15, at 74.
433 See ARNHOLM, supra note 56, at 11-12 for a general discussion of the good faith
requirement implicit in Norwegian contract law.
434 The Schlesinger Report does not distinguish writings from other formalities. See I
SCHLESINGER, supra note !, at 177 n. . There is no need to distinguish these concepts at
Norwegian law.
435 Norwegian law does impose some requirements of form in certain types of con-
245
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
II. Types of Form Agreements
An agreement to reduce a transaction to writing can be made
either in the course of negotiations leading up to the written con-
tract, or in a separate contract contemplating a writing for a future
contract between the parties.4 36 Such an agreement can also be con-
tained in a contract clause providing that any future agreement to
modify or terminate the contract be in writing or another specified




Norwegian law permits the parties, by use of appropriate lan-
guage, to stipulate that the contemplated writing shall be constitu-
tive. This principle prevents contractual formation unless
contemplated formality takes place.4 3
9
IV Non-Constitutive Formality
Norwegian law also permits the parties to a contract to indicate
by use of appropriate language that the suggested writing or formal-
ity is not to be constitutive. In this case, the contract will be deemed
to exist even though the formality never occurs. 4 4 0
V. Formality not Clearly Constitutive or Non-Constitutive
Many times the parties will not specify whether they intend the
formality to be constitutive or non-constitutive. Norwegian law
views this as a question of interpretation and applies an objective
approach in seeking a reasonable result.44 1 Norwegian courts will
look carefully at the actions of the parties after the alleged conclu-
sion of the contract. Where one party receives a written communica-
tion from the other party that purports to set forth the terms of their
contract, he or she incurs a duty (reklamasjonsplikt) to let the other
party know of any dissatisfaction. If such party does not do so, he or
she will be bound to the contract as it is written. 4 4 2
tracts. See, e.g., § 3 no. 6 and no. 9, and § 109, Lov av 13 august 1915 no. 7 om tvangs-
fullbyrdelse (writing required for letters of credit, leases, and mortgages-the latter where
the mortgagee would sell at public sale). In Norway, certain contracts also must be in
writing if one party demands it. See, e.g., § 5 Lov av 16juni 1939 no. 6 om husleie (rental
agreements). Norwegian law has no general writing requirements equivalent to the An-
glo-American Statute of Frauds.
436 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 24-25.
437 See id. at 34.
438 See id.
43 1 See AvItl., supra note 6, § 1; see also ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 76.
440 See Avl., supra note 6, § 1; see also ARNIHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 77.
441 See ARNHOLM PII, supra note 15, at 35-36.
442 Id. at 76.
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VI. Waiver
Waiver of requirements of form may be by express words or
conduct. An additional writing is not required.443
D. Summary
This Article is an overview of the Norwegian law of contract for-
mation and is intended as a supplement to Formation of Contracts: A
Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems, edited by Rudolf B. Schles-
inger. The Article examines the Norwegian Contract Code, certain
Norwegian-language treatises on contract law, and, where available,
Norwegian case law. Based on this examination, the Article provides
general statements of the law of contract formation in Norway.
The Article follows the outline used by the Schlesinger Report
for the disposition of these subjects, and, to the extent possible, an-
swers the same questions, in the same order, as the Schlesinger Re-
port did for the legal systems it studied.
It is not possible within the scope of this Article, nor is it the
author's intent, to provide more than a brief summation of Norwe-
gian law on contract formation. The Article does pay particular at-
tention, however, to the "promise principle" in Norwegian law and
its effect on the substantive rules of contract formation. The Article
also briefly compares the "promise principle" of Norwegian law to
the "contract principle" of English and American law.
The Article places substantial reliance on Norwegian treatises
on contract law, particularly those of Professor Carl Jacob Arnholm,
as the source of many of its conclusions on the state of Norwegian
law. This reliance was necessitated by the paucity of Norwegian case
law on many of the subjects covered. The reliance is justified, per-
haps, by the prominence of these treatises, particularly those of Pro-
fessor Arnholm, in any discussion in Norway of Norwegian contract
law.
This Article should be viewed as an English-language roadmap
to the law of contract formation in Norway generally, and to the in-
formation contained in the Norwegian-language treatises on con-
tracts specifically. The Article is intended to aid subsequent
researchers that dig into the fertile fields of Scandanavian contract
law. Unfortunately, very little has been written in English about this
area of law. As Professor Schlesinger writes, the Scandanavian legal
systems certainly do "present original solutions on some of the con-
troversial problems" of the law of contract formation. 444
Scandinavian originality, at least as discussed in this Article on
Norwegian law, does not appear to undermine the statements of the
44" See id. at 37.
444 1 SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 30 n.36.
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law of contract formation contained in the General Reports section
of the Schlesinger Report.445 On the contrary, a comparison of the
statements of Norwegian law found in this Article with the state-
ments of law in the General Reports indicates clearly that, as pre-
dicted by the Schlesinger Report, the Norwegian law of contract
formation bears out the statements of the law in the General
Reports.446
445 Id. at 69-190. The General Report section generally found more similarities than
differences when it compared and summarized the laws of contract formation for the legal
systems the Report studied. Id. at 37-43. The differences and similarities, however, for a
variety of probable reasons, were a "crazy quilt." Id. at 41 n. 14a.
446 Id. at 30.
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